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In the fall of 2014, Rolling Stone Magazine published an 
article describing the rape of a woman at a University of Virginia 
fraternity house. The story turned out to be false, and members of 
the fraternity sued for defamation. The suit raises an interesting 
question: under what circumstances may anonymous individual 
members of the fraternity recover? This Note describes the case, 
related common and constitutional law, as well as differences in 
group defamation doctrine across jurisdictions. After detailing 
problems with the existing paradigm, the Note proposes a new 
method for performing the analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For oh, ‘twas nuts to the Father of Lies 
(As this wily fiend is named in the Bible) 
To find it settled by laws so wise, 
That the greater the truth, the worse the libel!1 
 
In November of 2014, Rolling Stone Magazine2 published an 
online article entitled “A Rape on Campus: A Brutal Assault and 
Struggle for Justice at UVA” (“the Article”).3 The Article, written 
as an exposé of rape culture at the University of Virginia (“UVA”) 
generated worldwide attention, with its webpage receiving nearly 
three million views in the weeks following publication.4 The story 
contained a graphic and violent scene, describing the brutal gang 
rape5 of a freshman named Jackie during a Phi Kappa Psi6 (“PKP”) 
                                                                                                             
1 8 THOMAS MOORE, A Case of Libel, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF THOMAS MOORE: 
COLLECTED BY HIMSELF 221, 224 (1841). Defamation law encompasses both written or 
durable expressions known as “libel” and spoken/ephemeral expressions or “slander.” 
See infra Section I.C. 
2 Rolling Stone is a biweekly magazine founded in 1967 that reports on music, 
culture, and politics. Rolling Stone, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/Rolling-Stone [https://perma.cc/4ELA-5QL7] (last updated Aug. 24, 2018). 
3 Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC (Elias II), 872 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2017). 
4 Id. The article went “viral,” attracting more viewers than any non-celebrity article 
ever published by Rolling Stone. Sheila Coronel, Steve Coll & Derek Kravitz, Rolling 
Stone’s Investigation: ‘A Failure That Was Avoidable,’ COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 
5, 2015), https://www.cjr.org/investigation/rolling_stone_investigation.php [https://
perma.cc/YZ33-23BH]. 
5 Rape committed by two or more people against the same victim in the same or 
sequential criminal episodes. Gang Rape, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017). 
When large numbers of attackers are involved, it is also termed mass rape. Id. 
6 Phi Kappa Psi (“PKP”) is a national collegiate fraternity, founded at the College of 
Charleston in 1904. About, PHI KAPPA PSI, http://www.pikapp.org/content.aspx?id=402 
[https://perma.cc/7KZG-ANTT] (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). 
874         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:871 
 
date party in the fall of 2012.7 Jackie, who served as the primary 
source for the Article, described being thrown through a glass table 
and raped at the hands of seven fraternity members while others 
watched.8 The story described onlookers encouraging attackers by 
exclaiming “[d]on’t you want to be a brother?” and “[w]e all had to 
do it, so you do, too.”9 The Article’s author Sabrina Erdely10 
reported that UVA responded inappropriately,11 given that two 
other women confided that they too had been gang-raped at PKP, 
and that a rape occurred there in 1984.12 In a podcast for Slate 
magazine (the “Podcast”),13 the Article’s author commented that 
the behavior she described “seem[ed] to indicate  . . .  some kind of 
initiation ritual,” and that it appeared “impossible that [fraternity 
members] didn’t know about [the rapes].”14 
The Article ignited a national debate as well as sizeable 
protests on UVA’s campus, with PKP becoming the subject of 
                                                                                                             
7 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102; Bill Wyman, 5 Takeaways from the Rolling Stone 
Defamation Verdict, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.cjr.org
/analysis/rolling_stone_verdict_defamation_case.php [https://perma.cc/TG9K-VCF3]. 
8 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102. 
9 Id. at 102–03. 
10 Sabrina Erdely, a journalist for the Rolling Stone and named defendant in related law 
suits, authored the Article and collaborated with Slate to produce a podcast about the 
Article’s content. Id. at 97. 
11 The Article named Dean Nicole Eramo as being complicit in a system that failed to 
adequately respond to rape on campus. Id. at 103. Dean Eramo brought a separate suit in 
Virginia against Rolling Stone and Erdely. Eramo v. Rolling Stone, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 
867 (W.D. Va. 2016). 
12 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103. A rape occurred at the PKP house in 1984 per the 
confession of William Beebe twenty-one years later. Liz Seccuro, A History of Violence: 
Not Huguely, but the University of Virginia, HUFFINGTON POST, https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/liz-seccuro/a-history-of-violence-not_b_592208.html 
[https://perma.cc/6GXB-QWRR] (last updated May 25, 2011). Members of the fraternity 
implicated in the confession invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned about the 
incident and never faced charges. Liz Seccuro, I Was Gang Raped at a U-VA Frat 30 
Years Ago, and No One Did Anything, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 16, 2014, 5:55 AM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/i-was-gang-raped-at-a-u-va-frat-30-years-ago-and-no-
one-did-anything [https://perma.cc/2BCP-NG38]. 
13 Slate magazine interviewed Sabrina Erdely for a podcast (“the Podcast”) related to 
the Article on November 20, 2014. Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102–03, 110. Slate is a daily 
online magazine founded in 1996 covering politics, news, business, technology, and 
culture. About Us, SLATE, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/slate_fare
/2006/08/about_us.html [https://perma.cc/L6XF-9HQH] (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). 
14 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103. 
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vilification, vandalism, and ultimately suspension.15 Yet, just 
weeks after the Article’s publication, journalists investigating the 
incident from the Washington Post, Slate, and other publications 
began to question the story.16 The scrutiny revealed Erdely never 
verified any of Jackie’s account, sought out the perpetrators, or 
spoke to relevant school officials about the incident.17 When 
investigators and journalists followed up with Jackie,18 the 
inconsistencies in her story became too large to ignore.19 Rolling 
Stone’s managing editor issued a public apology: citing 
“discrepancies in Jackie’s account,” he concluded “that our trust in 
[Jackie] was misplaced.”20 By late March of 2015, the 
Charlottesville Virginia police department concluded their 
investigation, stating that “[t]here is no substantive basis to support 
the account alleged in the [Article].”21 Rolling Stone retracted the 
Article just days later in April,22 concurrent to self-publication of a 
                                                                                                             
15 T. Rees Shapiro, Key Elements of Rolling Stone’s U-Va. Gang Rape Allegations in 
Doubt, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/u-
va-fraternity-to-rebut-claims-of-gang-rape-in-rolling-stone/2014/12/05/5fa5f7d2-7c91-
11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.770fb4b98e3e 
[https://perma.cc/89HT-7Q4P]. 
16 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103; see Allison Benedikt & Hanna Rosin, The Missing Men: 
Why Didn’t a Rolling Stone Writer Talk to the Alleged Perpetrators of a Gang-Rape at 
the University of Virginia?, SLATE (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles
/double_x/doublex/2014/12/sabrina_rubin_erdely_uva_why_didn_t_a_rolling_stone_writ
er_talk_to_the_alleged.html [https://perma.cc/2SUD-4RBS]; T. Rees Shapiro, Key 
Elements of Rolling Stone’s U-Va. Gang Rape Allegations in Doubt, WASH. POST (Dec. 
5, 2014), http://wapo.st/1vnF3ed?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.770fb4b98e3e [https://
perma.cc/89HT-7Q4P]. 
17 Bill Wyman, 5 Takeaways from the Rolling Stone Defamation Verdict, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/analysis
/rolling_stone_verdict_defamation_case.php [https://perma.cc/WVV6-JWAB]. 
18 T. Rees Shapiro, Key Elements of Rolling Stone’s U-Va. Gang Rape Allegations in 
Doubt, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/u-
va-fraternity-to-rebut-claims-of-gang-rape-in-rolling-stone/2014/12/05/5fa5f7d2-7c91-
11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html?utm_term=.9945e3f4634a [https://perma.cc/89HT-
7Q4P]. Jackie stuck to her story throughout the ordeal. Id. 
19 Id. For example, Jackie was initially unable to provide and later to spell the name of 
a man involved in the attack. Coronel et al., supra note 4. 
20 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103. 
21 Coronel et al., supra note 4 (“This finding, said Police Chief Timothy Longo, 
‘doesn’t mean that something terrible didn’t happen to Jackie that night.’”). 
22 Id. 
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report detailing the erroneous journalistic practices that led to 
publication.23 
Even before the conclusion of formal investigations and 
Rolling Stone’s retraction, the Article induced public speculation 
as to who could recover in tort for damages resulting from 
publication.24 As it turned out, a variety of plaintiffs sued Erdely 
and Rolling Stone, and many of the resulting suits settled out of 
court.25 However, the claims of three individual fraternity members 
would test the limits of which defamation claims were actionable. 
Initially, U.S. Southern District Judge P. Kevin Castel held that the 
students did not have a claim.26 The court accepted the defense 
argument that individuals cannot sue when the defamatory 
statement simply casts aspirations on a group of which the 
plaintiffs were members.27 Surprisingly, the Second Circuit 
reversed the lower court and, taking a bold doctrinal step, held that 
the student plaintiffs successfully stated a claim.28 
Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC therefore stands as an emblem of 
the problem of group libel: under what circumstances should 
courts permit claims to proceed?29 Can the size of the group 
determine whether a plaintiff should be permitted to recover? What 
if the plaintiff is not named, but can be identified by people 
familiar with the circumstances? In deciding this question of law, 
what factual evidence should be weighed to make the 
determination? Relatedly, how should courts reconcile the need to 
set right the victims of group defamation with the need to protect 
speech about groups? 
                                                                                                             
23 Id. The report, commissioned by Rolling Stone and conducted by the Dean of the 
prestigious Columbia University School of Journalism, outlined the journalistic and 
editorial failures resulting in the publication of the Article’s account. Id. 
24 See Eugene Volokh, Libel Law and the Rolling Stone / UVA Alleged Gang Rape 
Story, WASH. POST, (Dec. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/12/06/libel-law-and-the-rolling-stone-uva-alleged-gang-rape-
story/?utm_term=.6b5678419492 [https://perma.cc/YL37-CELC]. 
25 See infra Section II.D. 
26 Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC (Elias I), 192 F. Supp. 3d 383, 392–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017). 
27 Id. 
28 See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, at 105–11 (2d Cir. 2017). 
29 Id. 
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In considering these questions, defamation law generally limits 
claims brought by individuals following the defamation of their 
group.30 Two approaches have developed for resolving when to 
make an exception and permit individual recovery following 
defamation of groups and anonymous group members. The Second 
Circuit’s decision in Elias31 calls to attention the two competing 
approaches. The majority32 of states adhere to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (“the Restatement”) position, which contains a 
presumptive requirement that groups contain twenty-five or fewer 
members for individuals to recover.33 New York and Oklahoma 
reject the Restatement approach for a more plaintiff-friendly 
standard called the “Intensity of Suspicion” test.34 
In Elias, the Second Circuit applied the Intensity of Suspicion 
test in a manner that would permit every member of PKP to 
recover individually,35 where the defamatory material named none 
of the plaintiffs directly.36 Because the number of group members 
                                                                                                             
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“As a 
general rule no action lies for publication of defamatory words concerning a large group 
or class of persons.”); see also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2:9.4, at 2–160 
(5th ed. 2017) (describing policy reasons for the rule, namely that permitting members of 
groups to recover with no restriction would cause proliferation of unwarranted litigation, 
with resultant damage to the free speech). 
31 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108–09. In Elias II, the Second Circuit overturned the Southern 
District of New York’s decision in Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation case on a 12(b)6 motion. Id. at 111. The suit and appeal 
arose as the result of the Article’s content. 
32 The author researched current law at the time this Note was written in April of 2018. 
In some states adopting the Restatement position, there has been discussion, but never 
application or adoption of the alternative “intensity of suspicion” approach. See, e.g., 
Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 383 (Utah 2007) (rejecting the notion that the size of the 
group bars a claim and discussing the intensity of suspicion test in footnote 114 of the 
case). See Granger v. Time, Inc., 568 P.2d 535, 539 (Mont. 1977) (evaluating and 
rejecting a claim concerning a group of approximately 200 persons based on the number 
of group members). 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b; see infra Section II.B. for a 
discussion of the Restatement position and the presumptive limit of twenty-five 
group members. 
34 The Intensity of Suspicion test, while considering group size, does not apply the 
Restatement’s twenty-five-person limit. See infra Section II.C. 
35 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 110 (“Because the [defamatory material] plausibly implied that 
all fraternity brothers knew about the alleged rapes, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that 
they were defamed because they were members of the fraternity at the relevant time.”). 
36 Id. at 101, 108. 
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in Rolling Stone exceeded twenty-five, it is very unlikely that such 
a claim would succeed in any of the states adopting the majority 
Restatement (Second) position.37 Such a result illustrates the 
argument that defamation law’s complexity promotes inconsistent 
outcomes, and invites a discussion of how to best address group 
defamation cases.38 
This Note examines both the Restatement position and the 
Intensity of Suspicion Test, ultimately concluding that neither is 
completely satisfactory. Part I discusses defamation law generally. 
Part II discusses the two competing approaches to group 
defamation, then narrows to a discussion of the Elias decision. 
Finally, Part III proposes a novel test (“the Test”) for resolving 
group defamation problems and associated First Amendment 
concerns, and applies the analysis to Elias. 
I. A CONCISE BACKGROUND OF DEFAMATION LAW 
American defamation law arises from the interplay between 
state-level common law and constitutional restrictions on liability 
developed following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan.39 The resulting body of law, notorious for 
inconsistencies and complexity, is the topic of the following 
sections.40 Section I.A describes the early features of American 
defamation law. Section I.B provides an overview of the 
constitutional aspects of the tort. Modern common law elements 
                                                                                                             
37 See infra Section II.B. 
38 See SACK, supra note 30, at li–liv. 
39 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN 
CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1st ed. 1991). 
40 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, § 1:1 (2d ed. 2017). Barron Pollock 
described defamation as “perplexed with minute and barren distinctions.” SIR FRANCIS 
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 220 (5th ed. 1895). Prosser notes that “there is a great deal 
in the law of defamation which makes no sense.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 771, § 111 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser, a famous legal scholar, 
developed strict products liability in addition to publishing The Law of Torts, a widely 
recognized and authoritative work on the subject of torts. See generally WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER’S TORTS]; William L. 
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 
1099 (1960). Prosser also served as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at v. 
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are discussed in Section I.C. Finally, Section I.D covers the “of 
and concerning” element and its First Amendment implications. 
A. Common Law Origins 
Historically, American culture relegated defamation law to 
relative obscurity.41 Disdain for feudalistic concepts of honor and 
nobility, a lack of remedy for emotional injury at tort law, and 
fundamental appreciation of free speech contributed to its lack of 
preeminence.42 Despite societal ambivalence, courts of the pre-
constitutional43 era were quite receptive to claims, in what was 
essentially a strict liability tort.44 
The original Restatement (First) of Torts, published in 1938, 
proposed that “[t]o create liability for defamation there must be an 
unprivileged publication of false and defamatory matter of 
another . . . .”45 The First Restatement defined any statement that 
“tends [] to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him” as defamatory.46 Damages were 
presumed, and no showing of harm to reputation was necessary, 
only that the statement “tend[s] to have such an effect.”47 A 
plaintiff needed to demonstrate only that the speech was 
defamatory, and that the defendant published it, to plead a prima 
facie case.48 The falsity of the statement was also presumed, and 
truth was an affirmative defense that the defendant needed to assert 
and prove.49 Constitutional developments would eventually 
dispense with or modify much of the permissive common law 
framework of the early twentieth century.50 
                                                                                                             
41 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:4. 
42 Id. 
43 “Pre-constitutional,” meaning prior to the Supreme Court’s Decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
44 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:4. 
45 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
46 Id. § 559. 
47 Id. § 559, cmt. d. 
48 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:8. 
49 Id. 
50 See infra Sections I.B., II.B. 
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B. First Amendment Law 
Defamation law’s protections of reputation necessarily 
encroach on the unfettered right to speak, write, and otherwise 
express oneself.51 Accordingly, American defamation law cannot 
be understood without an overview of First Amendment principles 
elaborated by the Supreme Court over the past sixty years. Current 
law developed over the course of four ‘waves’ of seminal rulings, 
discussed below52: the first placed a restriction on defamation 
claims brought by public officials,53 the second expanded 
restrictions to public figure plaintiffs,54 the third described new 
standards for private plaintiffs,55 and the fourth reversed some 
protections developed by the first three.56 Following an overview 
of each decision, this Section considers the definition of important 
terms57 described in these cases as well as standards for the burden 
of proof. 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan58 placed the first constitutional 
restrictions on defamation law in 1964. The controversy arose at 
the height of the civil rights movement.59 At the time, The New 
York Times, having a circulation of just 400 subscribers in 
Alabama, ran an advertisement designed to elicit sympathy for 
civil rights demonstrators facing violent repression across the 
                                                                                                             
51 SACK, supra note 30, § 1:1–2. “Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from 
the field of free debate.” Id. (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)). 
52 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:16. 
53 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); see also infra Section I.B, 
notes 58–70 and accompanying text. 
54 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 
389 U.S. 28 (1967); see infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
these cases. 
55 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 343–47 (1974). 
56 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–61 (1985); 
see infra notes 107–13 and accompanying text. The extent to which First Amendment 
protections were actually rolled back remains a matter of debate. See SACK, supra note 
30, § 1:2.7, at 1–23. 
57 The relevant terms include “public figure,” “pubic official,” “public controversy,” 
“public issue,” and “actual malice.” See SACK, supra note 30, §§ 1:2.7, 1:4, 1:5; see also 
infra notes 67–69, 90–93 and accompanying text. 
58 376 U.S. at 256, 279–80, 283. 
59 See Leland Ware, Civil Rights and the 1960s: A Decade of Unparalleled Progress, 
72 MD. L. REV. 1087, 1088–92 (2013) (describing major civil rights events of the era 
which would serve as the backdrop to New York Times). 
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south.60 Statements in the advertisement were either exaggerated or 
outright wrong.61 Mr. Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Affairs 
for the City of Montgomery, brought suit for defamation in 
Alabama, and a jury awarded damages of $500,000.62 In essence, 
New York Times considered the (arguably obvious) use of 
defamation law to suppress unpopular speech.63 
New York Times declared that the need for “free political 
discussion . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional 
system,” and that criticism of the government cannot be punished 
by defamation law.64 Further, discussion of individual public 
officials65 must remain protected, even in the face of “vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
and public officials.”66 Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court 
declared that defamation suits brought by public officials must be 
supported by “actual malice,” a term of art.67 Actual malice is 
defined as “knowledge that [the defamatory expression] was false 
or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,”68 and must be 
proven to the standard of “convincing clarity.”69 In addition, the 
Court found that Commissioner Sullivan failed to present sufficient 
                                                                                                             
60 See LEWIS, supra note 39 for a history of the events surrounding New York Times. 
61 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258–59. 
62 Id. at 256. At the time, the Supreme Court was aware that there were “eleven libel 
suits by local and state officials against the Times seeking $5,600,000” and other similar 
suits against the press. Id. at 278 n.18, 294–95 (Black, J., concurring). 
63 See id. at 270–71. 
64 Id. at 254, 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
65 The definition of “public official” has been refined, to some extent, in Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, so as to include most, but not all, public employees. 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 
(1989); see also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah 1988) (holding that not all public 
employees are “public officials” and that those who are “public officials” do not have that 
legal status for every kind of defamation, and noting that “[t]he employee’s position must 
be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, 
entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in 
controversy.” (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.13 (1966))). 
66 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (citing Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 
(1949); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). 
67 Id. at 279–80. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 285–86. “Convincing clarity” is substantially more rigorous than the “by 
preponderance evidence” previously employed, but less than the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard used in criminal proceedings. See SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2:3. 
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evidence that the defamation concerned him, a concept central to 
group defamation, discussed below in Section I.D.70 
Just three years after New York Times, the Supreme Court 
considered two companion cases, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts71 
and Associated Press v. Walker.72 Both cases involved the review 
of large libel verdicts in which the plaintiffs were well known but 
were not government or public officials.73 The Court weighed 
whether to decide such public figure74 cases by elevated standards 
akin to those devised for public officials in New York Times.75 The 
ruling answered affirmatively, adding another class of plaintiff to 
those required to make an elevated showing of fault.76 Justice 
Harlan wrote for the plurality, attempting to establish a slightly 
different standard for public figures, but his position never 
achieved controlling status.77 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. resolved 
ambiguity created by Justice Harlan’s unique public figure 
standard.78 
Gertz79 established modern standards for defamation by 
affirming the “actual malice” standard for public persons80 and 
resolving, at least for a time, whether the “actual malice” 
requirement applied in private figure cases.81 The ruling was 
                                                                                                             
70 “[T]he evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable 
of supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made ‘of and 
concerning’ respondent.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288. 
71 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
72 389 U.S. 28 (1967). 
73 Wally Butts was a college football coach and General Walker was a political 
activist. See Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 135–36, 140. 
74 The definition of public figures evolved over a series of cases, discussed below in 
notes 89–91 and the accompanying text. 
75 See Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 146; see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at  
279–80. 
76 Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 155. 
77 Justice Harlan’s plurality position caused confusion, since the standard describing “a 
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the 
standards of investigation and reporting” is significantly different from the “actual 
malice” standard described in New York Times. See Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 155. 
78 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974). The Gertz court held that 
public figures and public officials would both be held to the “actual malice” standard. Id. 
79 Id. 
80 “Public persons” includes both public figures and public officials. See supra, notes 
65–76 and accompanying text. 
81 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. 
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complex. Writing for the court, Justice Powell rejected the 
defendant’s contention that the “actual malice” standard applies 
whenever the statement involved an issue of public concern, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff was a private figure.82 The 
ruling did not, however, leave private figure cases unaffected by 
the First Amendment.83 Instead, Powell held that a minimum 
negligence requirement must be satisfied in private figure 
actions,84 agreeing with the defendant’s argument that strict, or 
faultless, liability available at common law did not meet American 
constitutional standards.85 Adding further complexity, Gertz 
declared that even in private plaintiff cases, the recovery of 
presumed or punitive damages was prohibited without proof of 
“actual malice,” and, indeed, that absent a showing of “actual 
malice,” proof of “actual harm”86 was required in such cases.87 
With so much riding on the public figure/private figure 
distinction, courts put forward number of attempts to differentiate 
public from private persons, with one describing the analysis as 
“trying to nail a jelly fish to the wall.”88 The Gertz court described 
two categories of public figures: universal public figures,89 and 
limited purpose or vortex public figures.90 Universal, or all-
purpose public figures occupy “positions of persuasive power and 
influence” and must meet the “actual malice” requirement for 
                                                                                                             
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 347–48. 
84 Id. at 348. The Gertz court never actually used the word “negligence,” but instead 
prohibited liability “without fault.” Id. at 347. Lower courts have generally interpreted 
this term to mean “negligence.” See Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1975). 
This ruling left states free to set their own standards, provided that private-figure-
plaintiffs now proved, at a minimum, that a defendant had acted with some degree of 
fault. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–48. 
85 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–48. 
86 Defined as including, but not limited to, special or pecuniary damage, which 
includes general damage to reputation, personal anguish, humiliation, and suffering. Id. at 
349–50; see also infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
87 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351–52. This, as well as other restrictions, would be significantly 
diminished in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–61 (1985); see also infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text. 
88 Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), 
aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978). 
89 Such figures are “universally” subject to the New York Times standard and include 
persons generally recognized by the public as celebrities. SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2:77. 
90 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 352. 
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nearly all subject matters.91 While a ‘a larger than life’ celebrity 
fits the archetypical definition of the universal public figure,92 
courts have also treated corporations,93 universities,94 and 
individuals who attain the necessary status within their 
communities as universal public figures.95 Vortex public figures 
must meet the “actual malice” requirement only where defamed in 
connection to public controversies in which they participate.96 
Public interest97 alone does not define a public controversy: the 
matter must achieve open debate in the public forum and have 
foreseeable and significant consequences for nonparticipants.98 
Whether the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the controversy 
also plays a role in determining limited public figure status.99 
                                                                                                             
91 Id. Courts have found famous surfers, political candidates, and pornographic 
actresses to be universal public figures. See Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., 830 
F.3d 881, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2016); Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 
1081, 1095 (D. Haw. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 401 F. App’x 243 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Dolcefino v. Turner, 987 S.W.2d 100, 110 (Tex. App. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Turner v. 
KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. 2000). 
92 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2.77. 
93 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron’s, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
94 Ithaca Coll. v. Yale Daily News Publ’g Co., 433 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533–34 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1980), affd on other grounds, 445 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
95 Williams v. Pasma, 202 Mont. 66, 74, 656 P.2d 212, 216 (1982); see also Lluberes 
v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (commenting that “some 
courts . . . have extrapolated . . . that a general-purpose public figure need not attain 
‘nationwide fame,’ only ‘notoriety where he was defamed . . . .’”). 
96 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2:16. 
97 Public interest is defined as “[t]he general welfare of a populace considered as 
warranting recognition and protection.” Public Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2017). Public interest is, however, relevant to the analysis, as the defamatory 
statement must concern a matter of public interest to qualify for the requirement of 
negligence at trial. See infra, notes 107–13 and accompanying text. 
98 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
99 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134–36 (1979) (finding that plaintiff was 
not a vortex public figure despite “voluntarily” applying for public funding of his 
research, which the defendant ridiculed); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 
U.S. 157, 166–69 (1979) (reasoning that plaintiff was not a vortex public figure because 
his participation was involuntary and there was no controversy); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976) (finding that socialite plaintiff was neither a universal 
public figure nor a vortex public figure for “voluntarily” entering a controversy by 
initiating litigation); see also Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 
612, 617 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that in order to receive public figure treatment, 
plaintiff must “(1) successfully invite[] public attention to his views in an effort to 
influence others prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily 
inject[] himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (3) 
2018] ROLLING STONE & GROUP DEFAMATION 885 
 
Nevertheless, courts have found involuntary participants to be 
limited purpose public figures in certain circumstances.100 
Whether and when groups qualify as public figures presents an 
intriguing question.101 In the case of vortex public figures, courts 
have generally found numerous groups that involved themselves in 
controversies pertinent to the defamation to be public figures.102 
The issue has been, at least tangentially, addressed as courts 
evaluate how to treat corporations, which have received varied 
treatment.103  Some courts always subject corporations to the New 
York Times standard on the grounds that they have no personal 
reputation, anytime the defamation addresses a relevant matter of 
public interest.104 Others reject this approach and seek to determine 
                                                                                                             
assume[] a position of prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintain[] regular 
and continuing access to the media”). 
100 Gertz notes that “it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through 
no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must 
be exceedingly rare.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see Street v. 
Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234–35 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815 
(1981), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981) (finding a victim in a notorious rape case 
who gave press interviews and promoted her version of the story to be a public figure); 
Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736,  (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding an air traffic 
controller on duty when an airplane crashed held to be a public figure, despite his not 
seeking attention); see also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297–98 (establishing three factors 
for determining public figure status: 1. Is there a public controversy? 2. Has the plaintiff 
played a sufficiently central role in the controversy? and 3. Is the alleged defamatory 
statement relevant to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy? The court also noted 
that that “unless [the involuntary participant] rejects any role in the debate, he too has 
‘invited comment’ relating to the issue at hand.”). A central reason for recognizing 
involuntary public figures is to prevent an “end run” around constitutional protections. 
See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1257–58 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 962 (1981) (holding that Elvis Presley’s ex-girlfriend and her husband 
were public figures for the purposes of a defamatory article, despite her husband’s 
involuntary and attenuated connection to the public controversy). But cf. Wells v. Liddy, 
186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118 (2000) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s bad luck of being wiretapped by the Watergate burglars did not qualify her as a 
public figure even while accepting the possibility, generally, of an involuntary public 
figure). 
101 See, e.g., SACK, supra note 30, § 5:3.5 (listing a brokerage, a private corporation in 
charge of corrections centers, Trump University, a law school, and various organizations 
as being found to be limited purpose public figures). 
102 Id. 
103 See id. § 5:3.7. 
104 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955 
(D.D.C. 1976). 
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whether the corporation is itself “public” by querying whether the 
company engaged in the promotion and sale of securities.105 Still 
others look to case specific factors, such as whether the 
corporation sought publicity, as in the case of advertisements, in 
making the determination.106 Overall, authorities provide little 
clarity in the public/private figure determination when resolving 
how to treat groups. 
A more recent chapter in the development of Supreme Court 
defamation jurisprudence significantly altered First Amendment 
protections. The Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders107 effectively did away with the “actual 
malice” requirement where statements “do not involve matters of 
public concern.”108 The issue before the court was whether a 
business inaccurately reported as bankrupt by a credit service 
needed to prove “actual malice” in order to recover.109 While the 
Gertz court would answer in the affirmative, the Dun & Bradstreet 
court answered in the negative, reasoning that the report did not 
address a matter of public concern.110 The ruling left unanswered 
whether Gertz’s prohibition of liability without fault applies when 
statements are not of public concern,111 and how to define such 
                                                                                                             
105 See, e.g., Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that the determination rests on whether the corporation is (1) publicly traded, (2) 
the number of investors, and (3) whether the company promoted itself via press releases). 
106 Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research, Inc. v. Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, 705 F.2d 
98, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980). 
107 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). See 
SACK, supra note 30, § 5:3.3 for a discussion of when the “vortex” or “limited purpose” 
public figure standard applies. 
108 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751, 763. The New York Times “actual malice” 
standard applies to public officials, and public figures, but only when the statements are 
about “issues of public concern.” Id. 
109 Id. at 751, 757. 
110 The dissent in Dun & Bradstreet highlights the difficulty of sorting cases based on 
the “matters of public concern” criterion: Justice Brennan (dissenting) wrote that because 
the credit report concerned a public corporation, the false information was in fact a matter 
of public concern. Id. at 787. 
111 See SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 1:20, 3:17. Smolla interprets Dun & Bradstreet as 
suggesting that the plurality would endorse a return to strict liability in private figure 
cases not involving matters of public concern. Id. The First Circuit noted that the First 
Amendment does not protect all defamation cases. Galarneau v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc., 504 F.3d 189, 199 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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statements. Later rulings established that statements involve 
matters of public concern when they relate to keeping the 
community informed on important civic and social issues.112 
Determining whether speech addresses a matter of public concern 
depends on “content, form and context,” accounting for important 
linguistic and social considerations.113 
While discussions of torts best explain the cause of action with 
an initial disclosure of the elements, defamation law’s unique 
constitutional aspects limit the value of such an approach.114 To 
summarize, the constitutional features of defamation law change 
requirements for the plaintiff based on four factors: the identity of 
the defendant,115 the identity of the plaintiff, the character of the 
defamatory statement, and requirements of the jurisdiction whose 
law applies.116 Where circumstances do not call for the imposition 
of minimum standards of fault and proof, states are free to 
establish their own.117 Nevertheless, many states, as well as the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (the “Restatement”), incorporate 
                                                                                                             
112 Specifically, matters of public concern are “any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
113 Id. at 147–48. 
114 SACK, supra note 30, § 2:1. 
115 Courts are divided on whether Gertz applies to suits against non-media defendants, 
with the Dun & Bradstreet opinion seeming to eschew such a distinction. Dun & 
Bradstreet, 472 U.S at 772–74, 781 (White, J., concurring) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, 
e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1290–91 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying 
Gertz to a blog post). 
116 “A defamation case does not putter along as a state law case in its earliest stages, 
only to suddenly acquire First Amendment implication upon the tender of an affirmative 
defense . . . . [The Supreme] Court [has] infused the state common law of defamation 
with a constitutional dimension . . . .” Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 427 F.3d 253, 254–55 
(4th Cir. 2001) (Wilkingson, J., dissenting form denial of rehearing en banc), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
117 The Supreme Court has not decided whether fault is required for recovery in private 
plaintiff cases concerning statements outside of public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, 
472 U.S. at 773–74 (White, J., concurring) (presenting the view that Gertz’s requirement 
would be inapplicable in private concern, private figure cases); see also Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (mentioning in dicta that the [fault] 
requirement does not apply to private plaintiffs unless the matter is of public concern). 
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aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence into the law regardless of 
whether they are technically required.118 
C. Elements of the Modern Tort 
Bearing in mind the influence of First Amendment restrictions 
on recovery,119 the elements of defamation detailed below provide 
a useful checklist of issues to be addressed. The Restatement 
describes the following components, common to many 
jurisdictions,120 as necessary for defamation actions: 
(a) A false and defamatory statement concerning 
another; 
(b) An unprivileged publication to a third party; 
(c) Fault amounting at least to negligence on the 
part of the publisher; and 
(d) Either actionability of the statement irrespective 
of special harm or the existence of special harm 
caused by the publication.121 
The first element contains three important terms, including that 
the statement be false,122 defamatory, and concerning another. 
Falsity is frequently required at common law, and a prerequisite 
                                                                                                             
118 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) 
(requiring fault at a minimum, a standard absent from the common law and previous 
Restatement (First) of Torts, described in Section I.A.). 
119 Restrictions on recovery include elevated fault/proof standards for public persons 
and a minimum fault standard for private persons where statements concern public 
matters. See supra Section I.B. “Because the common law of defamation, federal 
constitutional law, and the constitutional law of the various states reflect many of the 
same underlying principles and adopt similar propositions, it is often unclear to what 
extent a court decision relies on each.” TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 
1182 (10th Cir. 2007). 
120 The Restatement (Second) elements share much in common with those devised 
statutorily or at common law in each state. See SACK, supra note 30, § 2:1, at 2–6. 
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558. 
122 Because opinion cannot be proven false, the court must determine whether the 
defamatory material conveys fact or non-actionable opinion. SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 
4:38 (“It is, after all, the court’s responsibility to distinguish non-actionable ‘obscenities, 
vulgarities, insults, epithets, name-calling . . . verbal abuse . . . and statements of 
rhetorical hyperbole’ from true defamatory language.”) (citing McCausland v. City of 
Atlantic City, 2006 WL 1451060 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)) (internal  
quotations omitted). 
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for recovery as a matter of constitutional law.123 Originally, the 
falsity of the statement was presumed, and the burden rested with 
the defendant to prove its truth.124 While presumed falsity remains 
available in some jurisdictions for some private figure plaintiffs,125 
all cases governed by elevated First Amendment requirements 
place the burden of proving falsity on the injured party.126 In 
addition to falsity, the first element also requires that the statement 
be defamatory. Defamation deals with expressions127 that tend to 
injure reputation.128 The precise definition and extent to which a 
statement must be capable of damaging reputation129 varies by 
                                                                                                             
123 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
124 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:8. 
125 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
126 This includes the majority of cases, specifically when there are public-figure 
plaintiffs, public-official plaintiffs, or private plaintiffs when suing media defendants 
over matters of public concern. Many courts reject the media/non-media distinction. See 
supra notes 51–116 and accompanying text. Notice that private plaintiffs may not be 
governed by Gertz if the defendant is not a member of the media or the statement is too 
far removed from the factors that give the plaintiff public status. Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. at 74 (1964); see SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:1.1, 5:2–5:3.10; see also supra 
Section I.B. 
127 While defamatory statements are usually words, nonverbal communication such as a 
drawing or photograph may also be defamatory. See Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 247, 
250–51 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that a photograph is capable of defamatory meaning 
when published in an erotic magazine); Burton v. Crowell Publ’g Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155–
56 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding that an advertisement with a photo containing optical illusions 
and graphics is capable of defamatory expression). 
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defining 
defamatory communication as that which “tends so to harm the reputation of another as 
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him”). 
129 As a threshold matter, the judge determines whether a statement may sustain 
defamatory meaning. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (“(1) The court determines 
(a) whether a communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning, and (b) whether 
that meaning is defamatory.”); SMOLLA,  supra note 40, § 4:38; see also Biro v. Condé 
Nast, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. 
Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). The factfinder must 
ultimately decide whether the communication was understood by its actual recipient as 
defamatory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (“(2) The jury determines whether 
a communication, capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its 
recipient.”); see also Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing James v. 
Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 837–38 (N.Y. 1976)). When there is ambiguity about the 
meaning and effect of the words, the question is for the jury. SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 
4:38; see Golden Bear Distrib. Sys. of Texas, Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 948 
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jurisdiction.130 Interestingly, this element requires inquiry into 
whether the statement would tend to injure the plaintiff, not 
whether it actually caused injury.131 A showing that the statement 
tends to injure substitutes for proof of a causal link between 
harmful behavior and injury commonly required in other torts.132 
Finally, the first element requires that the statement concern the 
plaintiff, a concept central to group defamation discussed in 
Section I.D below. 
The second element, unprivileged publication, pertains to 
whether the defamatory thoughts are expressed purposely or 
negligently to a third party.133 Every distinct publication gives rise 
to a new cause of action.134 A plaintiff does not need to prove 
publication with respect to specific recipients, only that third 
                                                                                                             
(5th Cir. 1983) (“If a defamatory meaning may exist, then the statement or article is 
considered ambiguous, and the court must allow the jury to determine whether an 
ordinary reader would perceive the statement as defamatory.”) (internal  
citations omitted). 
130 In New York, defamation is defined as “words which tend to expose one to public 
hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, 
degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of on in the minds of right-thinking 
persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society.” 
Kimmerle v. N.Y. Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933). Others have 
defined defamatory statements as those which “expose[] a person to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule, or obloquy, or which cause[] him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a 
tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126, 130 (Mont. 
1978) (quoting Lewis v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 512 P.2d 702, 705 (Mont. 1973)). 
131 This idiosyncrasy originates from both the difficulty of proving actual damage to 
reputation and reflects that some jurisdictions allow recovery for non-reputational 
(emotional) injury. SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:4.1–2:4.17. 
132 See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 747, 751 (1984). 
133 In other parts of this Note, the third party may be referred to as the “consumer” or 
“reader” of the defamatory material. Merely thinking, writing down, or sharing 
defamatory thoughts with the defamer’s target (or his agent, in some jurisdictions) cannot 
give rise to a defamation claim, since such private insults cannot result in harm to 
reputation. Mims v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 
345 U.S. 940 (1953); Turner v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 N.E.2d 106, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2006). 
134 See Pruis v. Bosse, 912 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Barber v. Daly, 
586 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)). Republications must be distinct, and 
identical ones are treated as a single publication to prevent the statute of limitations from 
tolling, for example, with each sale of a book. See SMOLLA, supra note 40,  
§§ 4:91–4:93.50. 
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parties received and understood it.135 The manner of publication, 
aside from determining whether libel or slander,136 does not 
usually prevent liability: courts have found drawings, gestures,137 
and other communicative media138 capable of carrying defamatory 
meaning. 
The third element, fault, determines legal responsibility,139 and 
is central to the Supreme Court’s rulings.140 When the plaintiff is a 
public figure or official he or she must prove “actual malice” to 
“convincing clarity,”141 a standard falling somewhere between a 
“preponderance of evidence”142 and “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”143 Cases involving matters of public concern require 
negligence proven by a “preponderance of the evidence.”144 If the 
case does not pertain to a public plaintiff or a matter of public 
concern, the degree of fault and standard of proof remain issues for 
state legislators and courts, with negligence being the most 
common standard.145 Since fault remains difficult to prove with 
                                                                                                             
135 See Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 597 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137 
(D.D.C. 2009). 
136 See infra notes 155–168 and accompanying text (discussing the  
libel/slander distinction). 
137 See Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 625 A.2d 959, 970 (Md. 1993) (finding that leading 
plaintiff through store in handcuffs qualifies as defamatory). 
138 See David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728, 742 (S.D. Tex. 
1998) (finding that on-screen messages are capable of a defamatory meaning). 
139 Fault is defined as “an error or defect of judgment or of conduct; any deviation from 
prudence or duty resulting from inattention, incapacity, perversity, bad faith, or 
mismanagement.” Fault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017). Fault is a 
“traditional element in determining legal responsibility . . . .” in both civil and criminal 
cases. Id. 
140 See Section I.B. 
141 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 285–86 (1964); see also supra 
Section I.B. for a discussion of the cases elaborating these standards. 
142 A “preponderance of the evidence” is defined as “[t]he burden of proof in most civil 
trials, in which the jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the 
stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be.” Preponderance of Evidence, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017). 
143 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1982), 
aff’d, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 619 F.2d 
932, 940 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). 
144 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 366 (1974). 
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“fault amounting at 
least to negligence on the part of the publisher”). Each jurisdiction sets its own standard. 
See SACK, supra note 30, §§ 6:1–6:4. 
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regard to defamation,146 and speaks to the extent of a defendant’s 
culpability, fault and standards of proof act as an adjustable 
balancing point between the competing interests of tort law147 and 
society’s interest in free discourse.148 
The final element of defamation in the Restatement dictates 
that the plaintiff must show that either the defamation is actionable 
without proof of “special harm,”149 that is, it is actionable “per 
se,”150 or that the publication caused such harm.151 Special harm or 
damages often refers only to pecuniary loss,152 but may also 
include intangible injury such as psychological or reputational 
harm in some jurisdictions.153 Interestingly, the need to prove 
special damages acts as a checkpoint rather than a limit on 
recovery: once this element is satisfied, plaintiff may recover 
special, actual, putative, and unproven presumed damages.154   
The distinction between libel and slander155 remains important 
at common law because of differences in the need to show “special 
                                                                                                             
146 See McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The 
standard of actual malice is a daunting one.”). 
147 This balancing includes providing recourse for injury and preventing harmful 
behavior, and it speaks to establishing normative standards of conduct. See Blanks v. 
Fluor Corp., 450 S.W.3d 308, 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 
S.W.2d 42, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)). 
148 See SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 1:25–1:27. 
149 The Restatement (Second) refers to “special damages” as “special harm.” See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); SMOLLA, supra note 40, 
§ 7:2. 
150 This term often causes confusion, since there exist both libel per se and slander per 
se, with each ascribing a different meaning to “per se.” See SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:8–
2:8.3. As used in this Note, “per se” means that the defamation is actionable without 
proving special damages. Id. 
151 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558; SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 7:1–7:5. 
152 See, e.g., Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 343 (3d Cir. 
2005) (defining “special damages” as monetary or out of pocket losses). 
153 Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 793–94 (Ky. 2004), overruled on 
other grounds by Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276 (Ky. 2014) (including 
reputational harm as within “special damages”). 
154 SACK, supra note 30, § 2:8. Proving special damages, however, becomes the “rock” 
on which many suits “founder.” Id. § 2:8.5. However, in order to obtain presumed or 
putative damages in media defendant cases where the statement at issue is about a matter 
of public interest, the plaintiff must prove the charge to the “actual malice” standard. See 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755–56 (1985). 
155 Defamation subsumes both of these concepts, with libel being written defamation 
and slander being spoken defamation. SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:10. 
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harm,” as described in the fourth element of the Restatement.156 
Libel, traditionally in writing,157 remains a tort with lower 
burdens158 on the plaintiff than spoken slander, because the written 
word was thought to “leave a more indelible blot” on plaintiff’s 
reputation, as well as potentially reaching a larger audience.159 In 
essence, a slander plaintiff has the additional burden of 
demonstrating “special harm,”160 unless the slander falls into four 
“per se” categories, including: 1) imputation of a serious crime 
involving moral turpitude; 2) possessing a loathsome disease; 3) an 
attack on business, trade or professional competency; and 4) sexual 
misconduct or depravity.161 The significance of the libel/slander 
distinction has diminished, due to the development of a 
constitutional overlay to the common law,162 and definitional 
problems associated with the emergence of widespread electronic 
and mixed media communications.163 
                                                                                                             
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558D. 
157 Courts generally include all forms of “published” defamations in the libel category, 
including radio and televised broadcasts. SACK, supra note 30, § 2:3. 
158 There is no need to show “special harm” for libel in jurisdictions adopting the 
Restatement (Second) position. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569. Other 
jurisdictions require a showing of “special damages” for libel where the statement’s 
defamatory meaning is libelous only in light of extrinsic facts. See, e.g., Newcombe v. 
Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a). In 
Newcombe, a California court dismissed a claim brought by a professional athlete and 
former alcoholic depicted in a beer advertisement because his former alcoholism was 
external to the defamatory material and he had not pled special damages. Id. 
159 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:13. The libel/slander distinction dates back to ancient 
times. Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 
558–73 (1903). 
160 Typically, “special harm” required a showing of pecuniary loss and is also referred 
to as “special damages” discussed in the fourth element of the Restatement (Second). See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558D; SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 7:1–7:5. 
161 Id. § 570. 
162 Unless “actual malice” is proven, Gertz requires proof of damages “supported by 
competent evidence” representing “actual injury” and cannot be presumed or putative 
damages in disguise. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974). Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. lifted the restriction for private figure 
plaintiffs on matters of private concern. 472 U.S. 749, 757–63 (1985). Effectively, the 
Gertz requirement for proving “actual injury” subsumes proving “special damages” in 
many cases. SACK, supra note 30, § 2.8.7(A), at 2–149 (noting that this conclusion may 
be an oversimplification). 
163 SACK, supra note 30, § 2:3. 
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The basic elements of defamation claims discussed above 
provide a useful background for understanding defamation. In 
Elias, as in many group defamation claims, the analytic focus 
shifts to one element in particular: whether the defamatory 
expression was “of and concerning” the plaintiff, discussed in 
detail below.164 
D. Of and Concerning, the First Amendment, and Group 
Defamation 
In order to succeed in a litigation, the first element of the 
Restatement165 dictates that the plaintiff must successfully show 
the defamatory statement was “of and concerning” him or her.166 
The rule requires that a nexus exists between the defamatory 
material and the plaintiff.167 As such, this element weighs whether 
a third party understood that the defamation was about the 
plaintiff,168 and in the case of group defamation, whether such an 
understanding conceivably leads to harm.169 Because there are 
many ways in which a defamatory communication may be vague 
                                                                                                             
164 Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 104–11 (2d Cir. 2017); see infra Section I.D. 
165 See supra notes 120–32 and accompanying text. 
166 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288–89 (1964); Kirch v. Liberty 
Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Julian v. Am. Bus. Consultants, 
Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1 (1956)); SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9; W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 40, § 113, at 802. Although the “of and concerning” element of libel 
claims generally presents a factual question for the jury, a court may dismiss an action for 
failure to state a claim, where the statements are incapable of supporting a jury’s finding 
that the libel refers to the plaintiff. Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Diaz v. NBC Universal, Inc., 
536 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 337 F. App’x 94 (2d Cir. 2009); Fernicola v. 
Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, Inc., 208 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). But see In re 
Houbigant, Inc., 182 B.R. 958 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that “whether the 
complaint alleges facts sufficient to demonstrate a connection between the plaintiff and 
the alleged libel is a question for the court”) (citing Cardone v. Empire Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield, 884 F. Supp. 838, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
167 Fernicola, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 308. This connection, akin to causation in other torts, 
assures that the plaintiff and the injurious action are, in fact, related. 
168 Kirch, 449 F.3d at 398. 
169 In group defamation, only the plaintiff’s group is identified and the link to plaintiff’s 
individual reputation arises from his or her membership in the disparaged group. See 
infra Part II. 
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as to the identity of the plaintiff,170 the requirement significantly 
limits the eligibility of those who may recover.171 
Originally, a publisher did not need to intentionally target the 
plaintiff, nor was a showing of negligence necessary.172 To satisfy 
the “of and concerning” element, a fact finder only needed to 
conclude that the recipient of the defamation correctly, or 
mistakenly but reasonably believed173 that the publication referred 
to the plaintiff.174 For example, the Washington Post found itself 
liable for printing an article about a criminal, because of a local 
man’s coincidentally similar name and profession.175 The D.C. 
Circuit did not require that the plaintiff, a Washington D.C. lawyer, 
prove that the Post acted negligently or with wrongful motive; only 
                                                                                                             
170 For example, it is possible to defame somebody without naming them directly, as 
either the circumstances or additional publicly known information makes identification 
possible. See, e.g., Doe v. Hagar, 765 F.3d 855, 862 (8th Cir. 2014); Ball v. Taylor, 416 
F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2005). In Elias II, plaintiffs Elias and Fowler were identified in 
such a manner. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2017); see infra Section II.E. It is 
also possible to defame by imputation, for example, if the defamatory connection is 
implied. See SACK, supra note 30, § 2:4.5. On the other hand, vicarious defamation, or 
defamation of one’s family, friends, associates, company or other affiliates, generally 
does not give rise to liability. See id. § 2:9.5. Group defamation cases exemplify vague 
plaintiff identity. See infra Part II. 
171 See Kirch, 449 F.3d at 399–400 (finding that the “of and concerning” element of the 
tort “stands as a significant limitation on the universe of those who may seek a legal 
remedy for communications they think to be false and defamatory and to have  
injured them”). 
172 “The test is not whom the story intends to name, but who a part of the audience may 
reasonably think is named— ‘not who is meant but who is hit.’” Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 
P.2d 642, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting PAUL ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY 30 (3d ed. 
1966)); see also Dalbec v. Gentleman’s Companion, Inc., 828 F.2d 921, 925 (2d Cir. 
1987); Wash. Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F.2d 207, 207–08 (D.C. Cir. 1925). 
173 Circumstances dictate whether a communication may be reasonably understood to 
be “of and concerning” a plaintiff. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 128 (1st Cir. 
2006). Historically, if a plaintiff was not identified by name, it was necessary to plead the 
extrinsic circumstantial facts, called the “colloquium,” that identified her as the defamed 
party. SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.1 n.618 and accompanying text. Such facts are not 
necessary at the pleading stage in most modern courts but could be useful in cases of 
group defamation. See, e.g., Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104–08  (considering in its decision, 
while not called the “colloquium,” evidence of information identifying the plaintiffs not 
included in the defamation); SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.1 n.618. 
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). It is necessary that 
the recipient of the defamatory communication understand it as intended to refer to the 
plaintiff. Id. § 564 cmt. a. 
175 Kennedy, 3 F.2d at 208. 
896         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:871 
 
that readers understood the article to be about him.176 The standard 
requires that some number of recipients, and not the public at 
large, understood the defamation was “of and concerning” the 
plaintiff.177 The significance of this permissive common law 
standard would come under scrutiny in two Supreme Court cases. 
In addition to elevating fault requirements for public 
officials,178 New York Times brought the “of and concerning” 
element into the purview of First Amendment protections.179 Other 
courts increasingly recognize the constitutionally gravity of the “of 
and concerning” element.180 Commentators agree that “treatment 
of the ‘of and concerning’ doctrine, a threshold requirement of the 
First Amendment itself, is sound constitutional law.”181 The “of 
and concerning” requirement represents a “basic cornerstone”182 of 
defamation doctrine, reflecting another checkpoint balancing two 
competing interests: protecting reputation from falsehood on one 
hand, and freedom of expression on the other.183 
The “of and concerning” element’s constitutional aspects 
become important to discussions of group defamation problems, 
since these seek to resolve whether individual group members 
                                                                                                             
176 Id. 
177 Ultimately, a court must determine that “the libel designates the plaintiff in such a 
way as to let those who knew [the plaintiff] understand that he was the person meant. It is 
not necessary that all the world should understand the libel.” Dalbec, 828 F.2d at 925 
(quoting Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
178 See supra Section I.B. 
179 New York Times “constitutionalized” the previously unfettered common law tort of 
defamation, holding that the First Amendment requires a connection (the “of and 
concerning” element) between the defamation and the plaintiff. New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288–91 (1964) (holding that statements in a defamatory 
advertisement were too far removed from Commissioner Sullivan to support that the 
statements were “of and concerning” him); see also supra Section I.B. 
180 See SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:5.50 (citing QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 773 
A.2d 906 (Conn. 2001)); see also Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10-5022, 2011 WL 
2441898, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (“The First Amendment requires a plaintiff to 
establish that the statement on which the defamation claim is based is ‘of and concerning’ 
the plaintiff.”) (citing Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177  
(Cal. 1986)). 
181 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:5.50; see also SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.1, at 2–155. 
182 SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:5.50. 
183 Fault represents a similar checkpoint established by the Supreme Court. See supra 
Section I.B; see also supra notes 139–48 and accompanying text. 
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satisfy the element.184 In fact, the plaintiff in New York Times was 
himself in charge of a group of police, as an elected Commissioner 
of the City of Montgomery, Alabama.185 The defamatory 
statements never reference the Commissioner by name or title, 
asserting only that “truckloads of police armed with shotguns and 
tear-gas ringed the  . . . [c]ampus,” and that “[police] have bombed 
his home almost killing [Dr. Martin Luther King’s] wife and 
child.”186 While New York Times never discussed group 
defamation explicitly,187 the Supreme Court prohibited the 
inferential leap made in the Alabama holding, where the court had 
concluded that “in measuring the performance or deficiencies of 
groups, praise or criticism is usually attached to the official in 
complete control of the [group].”188 
In Rosenblatt v. Baer189 the Court again contemplated the “of 
and concerning” element and group defamation, confirming their 
importance to First Amendment jurisprudence.190 In its decision, 
the Court held that jury instructions permitting recovery for libel of 
government were constitutionally defective.191 Decided in shortly 
after New York Times, the controversy arose when a jury in New 
Hampshire awarded damages to a public ski area supervisor, where 
a news columnist had imputed that embezzlement and 
mismanagement occurred during his tenure.192 The publication did 
not name Baer explicitly, but in New Hampshire, recovery was 
possible on a group defamation theory provided that “imputation 
                                                                                                             
184 Because each unnamed individual member of a defamed group must satisfy the “of 
and concerning element” to pass constitutional and common law muster, this common 
law protection has become intertwined with First Amendment protections of speech. See 
infra Part II for a discussion of group defamation. Note that if a court holds that the 
defamation was “of and concerning” unnamed group members, this holding necessarily 
allows all unnamed group members to recover. See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 111 (2d Cir. 
2017); see also infra Section II.A. 
185 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
186 Id. at 257. 
187 It was discussed implicitly, however, since only the unnamed Commissioner and not 
individual members of the police brought suit. See id. 
188 Id. at 273–76 (emphasis added). 
189 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
190 Id. at 75. 
191 Id. at 83. 
192 Id. at 91. 
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of impropriety . . . cast suspicion upon all” group members.193 
Brennan wrote that where the defamatory meaning is inferred and 
no specific reference to the defendant can be demonstrated, no 
recovery is possible.194 
The precise impact of Rosenblatt and New York Times on 
group defamation claims remains debated but should not be 
overlooked. The reach of New York Times with regard to the “of 
and concerning” element in the context of group defamation has 
been questioned by the First Circuit, particularly where the 
plaintiff is not a public official.195 One scholar has suggested that 
the decisions essentially reject claims where the defamation 
concerns collective group failure, and permits them where the 
failure can reasonably be traced to individual failures by, or 
blameworthy characteristics of, group members.196 Regardless of 
how broadly or narrowly New York Times and Rosenblatt are read, 
the “of and concerning” element and group defamation law should 
be evaluated with First Amendment protections in mind.197 Both 
cases prohibit an inferential leap analogous to an inference that 
occurs in some form any time individuals are permitted to recover 
when only their group is defamed.198 Therefore, in seeking to 
understand and resolve group defamation problems, New York 
                                                                                                             
193 Id. at 77. 
194 Id. at 83. 
195 See Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu de P.R., Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
233 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (limiting the applicability of the New York Times’ “of and 
concerning” principles to cases brought by public officials on the grounds that the 
doctrine was developed to prevent back door actions for seditious libel or defamations of 
the government). But see Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 
893, 900 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff’d sub nom. 665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1981) (indicating that 
First Amendment values are relevant to the “of and concerning” element generally). 
196 Joseph H. King, Jr., Reference to the Plaintiff Requirement in Defamatory 
Statements Directed at Groups, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 343, 351–53 (2000). 
197 See Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 978 (D. Minn. 
1978), aff’d, 602 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that group defamation does in fact 
have a constitutional element, and that “[t]o hold that statements commenting generally 
on the [] controversy are of and concerning individuals prominent in the controversy 
would chill heated public debate . . . .” and would be incompatible with the First 
Amendment); see also Church of Scientology Int’l v. Time Warner, 806 F. Supp. 1157, 
1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
198 See infra Part II. 
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Times and Rosenblatt call to attention values and reasoning 
important to the discussion. 
II. GROUP DEFAMATION, TWO POSITIONS AND A RETURN TO ELIAS 
V. ROLLING STONE, LLC 
When persons within a group199 that has been defamed200 wish 
to bring individual claims, difficult questions arise as to whether 
the defamatory material is “of and concerning” the aggrieved 
parties.201 Part II begins with an introduction and brief history of 
group defamation doctrine in Section II.A. A presentation of two 
competing group defamation models follows, including the 
majority Restatement (Second) position in Section II.B, and the 
minority Intensity of Suspicion test in Section II.C. Finally, 
Section II.D returns to the Second Circuit’s application of group 
defamation rules to Elias and details problems associated with the 
current approaches. 
A. Group Defamation, Background and History 
The group defamation rule202 remains one of the most 
intriguing common law protections that plaintiffs must overcome 
to meet defamation pleading requirements.203 In general, the rule 
requires that “[a]n individual plaintiff must be clearly identifiable 
[in the allegedly defamatory statement] to support a claim for 
                                                                                                             
199 A group is defined as “a number of individuals assembled together or having some 
unifying relationship.” Group, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/group [https://perma.cc/2W8L-562U] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
The characteristics of a group play an important role in the legal consequences of 
defamation. See infra Sections II.B–C. 
200 There are many ways in which a group, as compared to an individual, may be 
defamed. If the plaintiff is specifically named, the group defamation doctrine’s 
evaluations of group characteristics does not apply and recovery is permitted irrespective 
of group traits. Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 383 (Utah 2007). The group defamation 
problem arises whenever defamation concerns the group generally, that is, without 
naming specific individuals. Id. In general, racial slurs, insults and epithets against groups 
do not support a cause of action. Id. at 381. 
201 SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:9–2:9.1. 
202 Generally prohibiting individual recovery for defamation of a group, except for 
certain qualified circumstances. See infra Section II.B–C. 
203 See generally Nat Stern, The Certainty Principle as Justification for the Group 
Defamation Rule, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951 (2008). 
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defamation.”204 When making the assessment as to whether a 
member of a group has a cause of action, courts employ tests that 
consider several aspects of the circumstances.205 When claims fail 
to meet group defamation requirements, the connection between 
the defamatory material and the individual is too attenuated to 
support a claim, either for practical206 and procedural207 reasons or 
because constitutional protections of speech prohibit such 
claims.208 
The determination as to whether members of a defamed group 
may recover individually evolved over time.209 Early American 
courts developed group defamation rules while considering aspects 
of the situation such as the size of the group and whether 
individual members were identifiable.210 A series of cases from the 
nineteenth century proposed that no group member, unless 
specifically or individually named, would have a cause of action 
regardless of group size.211 This approach did not remain in favor, 
and several cases in later decades permitted groups composed of 
fewer than twenty members to proceed without remarks identifying 
                                                                                                             
204 See Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288–89 (1964)). 
205 See Sections II.B and II.C for a discussion of the Restatement and Intensity of 
Suspicion tests; see also SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.4. 
206 For example, when defamatory material alleged that an unidentified individual 
policeman out of a department of twenty-one (who each brought suit) locked himself and 
a female companion in the back of a police cruiser, the court dismissed the claim. Arcand 
v. Evening Call Pub. Co., 567 F.2d 1163, 1164 (1st Cir. 1977) (dismissed on the grounds 
that defaming a single unidentified policeperson did not sufficiently impact the reputation 
of all twenty-one group members). If dismissal in such cases was not justified, virtually 
every complaint of group libel would present a jury issue. Id. at 1165. 
207 From a procedural perspective, the cases and controversies component of the 
Constitution requires that the plaintiff suffer actual harm related to actions taken by the 
defendant. DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006); see also Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
208 See supra Section I.B. 
209 For a history of English and American group defamation cases see Jeffrey S. 
Bromme, Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors, 64 TEX. L. REV. 591, 598,  
602 (1985). 
210 Id. 
211 See White v. Delavan, 17 Wend. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837), rev’d, Ryckman v. 
Delavan, 25 Wend. 186 (N.Y. 1840); Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 475 (N.Y. Sup.  
Ct. 1815). 
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all members.212 Where there was a discussion of group size, it was 
often present only to suggest that the group was not too large.213 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the policy behind the 
group defamation rule had been well established, with courts 
allowing claims to proceed where defamation targeted an 
individual, and denying them where statements censured or 
satirized “an entire class or body of individuals.”214 In the decades 
that followed, discussions increasingly centered around the size of 
the group.215 In Service Parking Corp. v. Washington Times Co.216 
the court described that the “class [was not] so small . . . as to 
cause defamation of it to defame the appellant.”217 In Louisville 
Times v. Stivers,218 an appellate court commented that increasing 
group size attenuates the connection between the defamation and 
the plaintiff.219 These rulings set the groundwork for how modern 
courts evaluate group defamation problems. 
Among the most illustrative modern cases leading to the 
current majority position was Neiman-Marcus v. Lait.220 The 
case’s influence stems from a pleasant, reasoned division of groups 
based on their sizes.221 A former employee of Neiman Marcus 
published a book with defamatory remarks concerning three 
distinct groups within the company, each with a different size and 
                                                                                                             
212 See Bromme, supra note 209, at 603. 
213 Courts of the nineteenth century were “not very articulate” in explaining their 
reasoning. Id. 
214 Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Ass’n, 77 N.E. 660, 661 (N.Y. 1906); Stern, 
supra note 203, at 954. 
215 Stern, supra note 203, at 954. 
216 92 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1937). In Service Parking, a parking lot owner from 
Washington D.C. brought suit following publication of allegations that he had engaged in 
a “parking lot racket,” possibly “conducting an illegal business” and “obtaining money 
under false pretenses.” Id. at 503. At the time of the article’s publication in the Post, the 
complaint stated that twenty or thirty lots (group members) operated in the downtown 
neighborhood. Id. This was contrasted with a New York case, where a group of four 
coroners were permitted to recover. Id. at 505 (citing Weston, 77 N.E. at 662). 
217 Id. at 506. 
218 68 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1934). 
219 “As the size of the group increases, it becomes more and more difficult for the 
plaintiff to show he was the one at whom the article was directed, [until] it becomes 
impossible.” Id. at 412. 
220 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
221 Id. 
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specificity of allegation.222 The book identified all of nine models 
and most of the 382 saleswomen as “call girls.”223 Further, the 
book described most of the store’s twenty-five salesmen as 
“fairies.”224 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York described the importance of size, as well as the all/some 
distinction, and dismissed only the saleswomen’s claim.225 The 
court reasoned that the disparagement only concerned the 
saleswomen as a group, rather than as individuals because they 
were too numerous to have suffered individual harm.226 
Interestingly, the court noted that no legal distinction exists 
between the defamation of some salesmen and all models, likely 
because the small size of these groups made the difference in the 
fraction of the group implicated irrelevant.227 The cases described, 
as well as constitutional developments228 influence both of the 
modern approaches to group defamation outlined below. 
B. Majority, Restatement Position 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lays out the most widely 
invoked229 version of the group defamation rule: 
                                                                                                             
222 Id. at 313. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 316 (citing Service Parking Corp. v. Wash. Times Co., 92 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 
1937) (instructing that when groups are large, no one can sue even if the language is 
inclusive); see also Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 71 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1947) (holding that when less than all of the members are defamed, no cause of action 
exists); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 25 So. 2d 572 (Miss. 1946) (holding that 
even when only a number of  members are targeted in a group defamation, all may 
recover); Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Ass’n, 77 N.E. 660 (N.Y. 1906) (instructing 
that where a group is small, and each member is referred to, then any individual member 
can recover). 
226 Neiman-Marcus, 13 F.R.D. at 317. 
227 Id. at n.1 (“[I]t is difficult to perceive a legalistic distinction between the statements 
that ‘some Neiman models are call girls’ and ‘most of the sales staff are fairies.’”). 
Nevertheless, both the Restatement and the Intensity of Suspicion analyses rely, in part, 
on what fraction of the group the defamation implicates. See infra Sections II.B, II.C. 
228 See supra, Section I.B. 
229 McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 835 (Okla. 1984) (describing the 
“majority rule” of the Restatement); see DAVID ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE 
§ 1:32 (2017). In general, the majority of states do not permit recovery for groups larger 
than twenty-five. Id.; see also infra Section II.C. (explaining the minority position). 
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One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a 
group or class of persons is subject to liability to an 
individual member of it if, but only if, 
the group or class is so small that the matter can 
reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or 
the circumstances of publication reasonably give 
rise to the conclusion that there is particular 
reference to the member.230 
Courts adopting the majority, Restatement position favor a 
presumptive limit of twenty-five group members, above which 
recovery is not usually available.231 While group size plays a 
prominent role in all formulations of the rule,232 the majority 
position’s emphasis on a specific size crystalized following 
Prosser’s233 pronouncement that the rule bars recovery “quite 
uniformly” where group size exceeds twenty-five persons.234 The 
Restatement’s commentary reinforces the numerical guideline, 
deeming recovery available for individual members of groups 
“number[ing] 25 or fewer.”235 The Restatement leaves unanswered 
questions as to how to count group members, tasking the plaintiff 
                                                                                                             
230 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
231 See O’Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 223–24 (E.D. Ky. 1990), 
aff’d, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991); Webb v. Sessions, 531 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1975). 
232 See Bujol v. Ward, 00-1393 (La. App. 5 Cir 1/31/01), 778 So. 2d 1175, 1178, writ 
denied, 2001-0555 (La. 4/27/01), 791 So. 2d 117 (stating that “most authorities agree” 
that the group size shouldn’t exceed twenty-five); Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 
P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962) (rejecting absolute limits on size while adopting the intensity of 
suspicion test, which considers size); see also SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF 
DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND “MORAL RIGHTS” 35 (Anderson Pub. Co. 
ed.1988) (observing that the “size of the group will determine whether the statement is 
defamatory of the individual member”); King, supra note 196, at 394 (asserting that 
group size has been the most influential factor affecting group defamation claims and that 
it is often outcome determinative); Bromme, supra note 209, at 595 (1985) (suggesting 
that most courts rely heavily on size); Note, Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 894 
(1956) (mentioning that the size of a group is the most important variable in group 
defamation claims). 
233 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
234 PROSSER’S TORTS, supra note 40, at 750. 
235 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b. The Restatement references the 
number “twenty-five” a total of four times in the two pages dedicated to group 
defamation. Id. § 564A. 
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and courts with making the determination.236 In addition to 
allowing small group members to recover, the Restatement also 
permits recovery where evidence tends to show that the statement 
and circumstances identify the individual plaintiff.237 
In addition to group size, the Restatement also encourages 
courts to consider how many members of the group the defamatory 
statement implicates.238 For groups numbering fewer than twenty-
five, the commentary to the Restatement suggests that not all group 
members need to be named.239 Where fewer than all members are 
implicated, the commentary suggests that the proportion of parties 
implicated within a group determines the extent of suspicion that 
the defamation caused.240 Only statements that generate a high 
degree of suspicion, for example those containing language 
implicating a majority of the group, permit recovery.241 
The Restatement view invites recovery if the defamed group 
does not exceed twenty-five in number and where the defamation 
applies to a large fraction of the cohort.242 However, the numerical 
size and proportion of the group implicated associated with the 
                                                                                                             
236 See id. 
237 See, e.g., Ball v. Taylor, 416 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 564A cmt. b. The alternative Intensity of Suspicion Test suggests, and the author 
of this Note believes, that such identification pulls the plaintiff out of the group 
defamation analysis entirely. See infra Part III. 
238 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. c. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. Notice that while the Restatement mentions the “degree of suspicion,” this refers 
to the fraction of persons within the small (fewer than twenty-five person) group that the 
defamatory material concerns, a concept similar to, but distinct from, the Intensity of 
Suspicion test discussed below in Section II.C. Id. (“Even when the statement made does 
not purport to include all of the small group or class but only some of them, as in the case 
of ‘Some of A’s children are thieves,’ it is still possible for each member of the group to 
be defamed by the suspicion attached to him by the accusation. In general, there can be 
recovery only if a high degree of suspicion is indicated by the particular statement. Thus, 
the assertion that one man out of a group of 25 has stolen an automobile may not 
sufficiently defame any member of the group, while the statement that all but one of a 
group of 25 are thieves may cast a reflection upon each of them.”) 
241 Id. 
242 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 
531 (2d ed.) But see ELDER, supra note 229, § 1:32 (2017) (detailing cases where groups 
smaller than twenty-five were denied claims). 
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Restatement position, described as a “strong presumptions,”243 do 
not necessarily bar recovery if the group is larger than twenty-five 
or if less than a majority is implicated by the statement.244 
Nevertheless, jurisdictions adopting the majority position seldom, 
if ever, allow plaintiffs to recover for defamation of groups larger 
than the twenty-five person limit.245 
The majority position has found substantial support from both 
courts and commentators. With the exception of New York and 
Oklahoma, every state employs some variant of the framework.246 
The Restatement position assures that a court can be “certain”247 
that the group member has been defamed, a principle arguably 
congruent with other aspects of defamation law.248 One article 
suggests that the Restatement strikes a functional balance between 
“rigid numerical formula[s]” and “unpredictable ad hoc multifactor 
approach[es].”249 Another article fully embraces the simplicity of 
                                                                                                             
243 The Restatement qualifies its twenty-five-person guideline by stating that “definite 
limits” are not practical. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b; see also 
Stern, supra note 203, at 952. 
244 See, e.g., Ball v. Taylor, 416 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Iowa law and 
describing a case where fifty-eight plaintiffs were allowed to recover, but only because 
evidence that connected them to the defamation individually was present); see also 
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 242, § 531. 
245 The author of this Note, as of April 2018, was unable to find a single definitive 
example within jurisdictions adopting the majority Restatement position, where members 
of groups larger than twenty-five were permitted to recover. One case, Ball v. Taylor, 
applied the Restatement approach and permitted fifty-eight plaintiffs to recover. Ball, 416 
F.3d at 917–18. However, each of the plaintiffs in Ball were, in fact, individually named 
in a document issued concurrent to the defamation. Id. As such, this would logically take 
the case outside of the scope of the group defamation doctrine. See Pratt v. Nelson, 164 
P.3d 366, 383 (“When statements explicitly refer to individuals by name . . . a party 
cannot rely on the group defamation rule as a defense.”). 
246 See infra Section II.C. 
247 See Golden N. Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publ’g Co., 218 F.2d 612, 621–22 (9th Cir. 
1954) (elaborating  upon what the Ninth Circuit called the “rule of certainty,” that is, that 
it must be “certain” that the plaintiff was the person defamed); see also Brewer v. Hearst 
Publ’g Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1950) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that statements 
concerned him individually, “unless the publication can be said with certainty to include 
every member of the group”); Stern, supra note 203 (proposing that defamation law calls 
for certainty). 
248 Stern, supra note 203, at 953. 
249 Id. at 969. The author further proposes that the Restatement model would be best 
served if it were consciously informed by the “certainty principle” he describes as 
pervasive in defamation law: that the law demands certainty as to the falsehood of the 
statement, certainty as to the meaning of what was said as fact rather than opinion, and, in 
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the numerical guidepost suggested by the Restatement, and 
proposes a solution that would bar any claim with groups of more 
than twenty-five.250 
Nevertheless, several jurisdictions and scholars have called into 
question the prevailing model for considering group defamation 
claims. A method for addressing the problem employed by New 
York251 and Oklahoma,252 called the Intensity of Suspicion test, 
presents an alternative focused on evaluating evidentiary factors.253 
While group size and fraction implicated are relevant in these 
jurisdictions, these are only two of several variables considered, 
rather than the predominant criteria.254 
C. The Intensity of Suspicion Test 
1. Origins of the Intensity of Suspicion Test 
A law review note from 1934 (the “note”) first proposed the 
Intensity of Suspicion test while discussing the problem of group 
defamation.255 The note acknowledges the difficulties presented by 
group defamation, specifically that “formulation of definite rules 
governing liability seems impossible.”256 The authors rejected 
                                                                                                             
the case of media defendants speaking on matters of public interest, certainty as to their 
culpability. Id. 
250 King, supra note 196, at 347 (arguing that the proposed solution “would 
categorically disallow all claims by individuals to the extent they were based on 
statements targeting a group unless the group totaled twenty-five or fewer members”). 
251 See Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792–93 (1981) 
(adopting the intensity of suspicion test); see also Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 107–10 (2017) 
(applying Brady). 
252 See Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1977); see also McCullough 
v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 835–37 (Okla. 1984) (applying the intensity of 
suspicion test and rejecting a claim from statements concerning nearly 20,000 
physicians). 
253 See infra Section II.B. 
254 Id. 
255 Note, Liability for Defamation of a Group, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1325 (1934). 
This proposal predates the Restatement (First) of Torts (1938) which also allows group 
members to recover if the reader could identify that the individual or the group was 
sufficiently small. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 564(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1938). The 
Restatement (First) never precisely defines “sufficiently small,” but suggests, in 
examples, that the members of a school board and city council could recover. Id. 
256 Note, supra note 255, at 1325. 
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existing standards prohibiting individual recovery,257 and proposed 
an analysis calling for “a purely factual inquiry” as to whether the 
plaintiff was actually defamed.258 The note enumerated three 
parameters to be considered during the inquiry.259 First, size would 
be evaluated260: as the size of the group increases, probability of 
recovery would decrease, and vice versa.261 A sufficiently small 
group would negate the need for analysis, since reference to the 
plaintiff would be “obvious.”262 Second, the analysis weighs 
definiteness in the number and composition as well as group 
organization.263 A reader would more likely assign the material’s 
meaning to an individual belonging to a well-organized group with 
relatively static membership and numerosity.264 Finally, the 
analysis considers the fraction of the group implicated.265 
                                                                                                             
257 Id. at 1324–25. The note declared that Sumner v. Buel misinterpreted dictum from an 
earlier English case, resulting in the general prohibition of recovery for group defamation 
in America. Id. at 1332 (citing 12 Jons. 475 (N.Y. 1815)). Courts of the time struggled 
with whether to allow individual claims, because readers could infer that the defamatory 
statements did not concern some group members. Id. at 1324. The usual test, permitting 
recovery only when “special allusion has been made, either directly or as inferable from 
extrinsic circumstances,” is purely a legal fiction, “since no member is [actually] singled 
out of the group.” Id. The note proposed that the test should be whether the plaintiff was 
actually defamed, even when unnamed. Id. at 1323. 
258 Id. at 1325 n.20. The note comments that subjective tests, seeking to divine whether 
statements identify the persons defamed, were inferior and declining in favor of an 
objective test, namely, whether a reasonable man, upon hearing or reading the 
publication, would regard the plaintiff as one of those maligned. Id. 
259 Id. at 1325–26. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 1325. 
262 Id. at 1326 (citing Commercial Tribune Pub. Co. v. Haines, 15 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 
1929); Barron v. Smith, 101 N.W. 1105 (S.D. 1904)). The note’s authors refer to these 
two cases when referring to sufficiently small groups: Commercial Tribune concerned the 
only two motorcycle policemen in town and Barron concerned two high ranking officials 
of a miners’ union. Haines, 15 S.W.2d at 307; Barron at 101 N.W. at 1107–08. 
263 Note, supra note 255, at 1326. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 1326–27. The note comments that a cause of action has been “uniformly 
denied” where fewer than all members are named “because of uncertainty as to the 
identity of the persons at whom the statement is aimed,” and that such a result is unjust 
unless “the number accused is so small in proportion to the size of the [group] that the 
injury . . . is inconsiderable.” Id. at 1327. 
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2. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris: From Note to Practice 
In 1962, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered a football 
player’s claim against True Magazine, for an article entitled “The 
Pill That Can Kill Sports.”266 The plaintiff was a fullback on the 
Oklahoma University football team, and the article alleged that 
“substantially all”267 of the sixty to seventy-person team had been 
using performance enhancing narcotics.268 The substance turned 
out to be peppermint spray, administered to alleviate the athlete’s 
dry mouths.269 
In determining whether the material defamed the unnamed 
player, the Oklahoma court developed and applied the Intensity of 
Suspicion test.270 The court rejected absolute numerical limits, or 
that size alone should determine the plaintiff’s right to recover.271 
The decision considered the implications of the article: that readers 
would know of the plaintiff’s team membership due to its 
prominence within the community.272 Additionally, the ruling 
stressed that the reader, if a fan of sports, would also know the 
plaintiff’s identity and necessarily conclude that he used illegal 
drugs.273 Importantly, the Oklahoma court distinguished Fawcett 
from a prior, unsuccessful group defamation case on the grounds 
that the defamation in the True Magazine article imputed that all 
members of the group used an illicit substance.274 
                                                                                                             
266 Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 51–52 (Okla. 1962). 
267 Cf. Owens v. Clark, 6 P.2d 755 (Okla. 1931) (Distinguish Fawcett from Owens, a 
case in which judges made defamatory remarks about only some members of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court). 
268 Fawcett, 377 P.2d at 47. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 52 (citing Note, supra note 255, at 1322). 
271 Id. at 51 (“[W]e have found no substantial reason why size alone should be 
conclusive. We are not inclined to follow such a rule where, as here, the complaining 
member of the group is as well-known and identified in connection with the group as was 
the plaintiff in this case.”). 
272 Id. at 52. 
273 Id. (“[T]he average lay reader who was familiar with the team, and its members, 
would necessarily believe that the regular players, including the plaintiff, were using an 
amphetamine spray as set forth in the article . . . .”). 
274 Compare Owens v. Clark, 6 P.2d 755, 755 (Okla. 1931) (finding it not libelous to 
defame some members of the Oklahoma Supreme Court), with Fawcett, 377 P.2d at 42 
(holding that a statement regarding all members of the football team was sufficient to 
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Fawcett was met with approval by courts275 and 
commentators.276 In Oklahoma, McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co. 
applied the Intensity of Suspicion test and found that a defamatory 
statement disparaging all of the osteopaths in United States could 
not sustain an individual action.277 New York courts later adopted 
the Intensity of Suspicion analysis.278 Recently, a Utah court 
discussed the Intensity of Suspicion test seen in Fawcett with 
approval.279 The court declined to apply it, however, because 
individuals within the polygamous cult alleging defamation had 
been specifically named by the defendant.280 The Intensity of 
                                                                                                             
defame), and Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 97 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that a defamatory article 
implicating all members of a fraternity permits individual claims). 
275 See McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 836 (Okla. 1984). In 
McCullough, an osteopath brought a libel action against defendant company, alleging that 
the defendant libeled him and all other osteopaths in the United States by publishing a 
statement that medical doctors received better training than osteopaths. Id. The action 
was not sustainable, but the court approved the “intensity of suspicion” test in principle 
and commented that the “failure in every reported case [in] our attention to announce the 
precise numerical dividing line between groups which are ‘too large’ and groups which 
are ‘small’ enough to permit a plaintiff to recover, demonstrates the weakness of slavish 
reliance upon the general rule which relies upon numbers alone.” Id. See also Grove v. 
Morgan, 576 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Okla. 1978). In Grove, plaintiffs were members of a group 
of the only two people indicted by a Federal Grand Jury and established that the libel was 
of and concerning them by way of the intensity of suspicion test. Id. 
276 See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10, at 58 (1978) (opining that 
Fawcett may become a ‘landmark’ in American defamation law); W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 40, at 784 (commenting on Intensity of Suspicion favorably); Ellyn 
Marcus, Group Defamation and Individual Actions: A New Look at an Old Rule, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 1532 (1983) (noting with approval that the Fawcett court refused to be 
bound by the size-oriented test). 
277 McCullough, 676 P.2d at 835. The statement in question “does not disparage the 
Plaintiff’s standing within his profession or business. It is the Plaintiff’s profession or 
business itself which is assailed. In other words, Plaintiff’s standing or reputation as a 
D.O. is not impugned by the publication, nor is a group of D.O.’s of which sub-group the 
plaintiff is a member impugned.” Id. 
278 See infra Section II.B.3. 
279 Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 382 n.114 (Utah 2007). Pratt cites section 546(a) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 50 American Jurisprudence 2d Libel and Slander 
§ 349 (2006), comparing these to the Intensity of Suspicion test, with which they 
ultimately agree. Id. 
280 Pratt, 164 P.3d. at 379 The court explicitly declines to apply the Intensity of 
Suspicion test, implying that the analysis would be appropriate in this jurisdiction if 
necessary. Id. at 383. 
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Suspicion test continues to find favor with scholars and courts 
years after its inception.281 
3. Brady and Beyond: Importing the Intensity of Suspicion 
Test to New York 
In 1981, the Supreme Court of New York applied the Intensity 
of Suspicion test in Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.282 In 
Brady, the plaintiffs brought suit following printed allegations that 
a group of unindicted police officers were complicit or had 
knowledge of the corrupt and criminal activities of their accused 
colleagues.283 The group of unindicted policemen numbered fifty-
three, twenty-seven of whom brought suit.284 Notably, the article in 
question defamed all of the unindicted policemen by accusing 
them of having participated in the malfeasance of their accused 
colleagues.285 
The Brady court emphasized that the size of the group should 
not govern the group defamation doctrine.286 Invoking Fawcett, the 
Brady court proposed that the original Intensity of Suspicion 
factors were non-exclusive, and that other aspects of the 
circumstances could and should be evaluated.287 Brady concluded 
that the small-town police force was sufficiently small,288 well-
                                                                                                             
281 See infra Sections II.C.3, II.D. 
282 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (adopting the Intensity of Suspicion 
test, but deciding to “add[] refinement to the underlying concept” by incorporating the 
prominence of the group and the plaintiff within the community). 
283 Id. at 787 (The newspaper printed that “[t]he department was in a shambles in 1972 
after 18 officers, including Chief Humbert Capelli, were indicted on charges of burglary, 
planting of evidence and other misdeeds . . . . We said at the time, and we still believe, 
that the entire department was under a cloud. It is inconceivable to us that so much 
misconduct could have taken place without the guilty knowledge of the unindicted 
members of the department. If so, they all were accessories after the fact, if not before 
and during.”) 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 791 (“This analysis demonstrates that size is too narrow a focus to determine 
the issue of individual application in group defamation.”). 
287 Id. at 792–95 (citing Note, supra note 255, at 1325 and Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 42 (Okla. 1962)). 
288 The Brady court compared the size of the fifty-three-man group favorably to the 
group of 382 saleswomen and twenty-five salesmen in Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) and the 600,000,000 Muslims in Mansour v. Fanning, 506 F. Supp. 
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defined, and prominent within the community to permit the suit to 
proceed.289 The fact that individual plaintiffs were also prominent, 
having worn police uniforms, further suggested that they would 
face elevated suspicion of wrongdoing within the community.290 
Adopting the Intensity of Suspicion test, the court concluded that 
individual unindicted policemen satisfied the “of and 
concerning”291 requirement despite membership in a group larger 
than twenty-five.292 
A paucity of applications and constitutional problems call into 
question the actual success of the Intensity of Suspicion test. 
Despite adoption of the Intensity of Suspicion test293 in Brady, 
New York courts declined to apply the test to allow recovery prior 
to Elias.294 In Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News Inc.,295 
several subcontractors responsible for managing a New York strip 
club brought suit against CBS News for reporting that the club was 
run by the mob.296 The court rejected the claim, reasoning that the 
Intensity of Suspicion test would apply, but not under the facts as 
plead, because the defamation referred only to the establishment 
and not to a group of people.297 In Anyanwu, the court applied the 
test and found that a claim for statements potentially concerning 
                                                                                                             
186 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 791, 794. The court commented that “[w]e 
are not the only court to find size limitations unduly restrictive.” Id. at 792. 
289 Id. at 793–95. The court also determined that the group of unindicted police were 
better defined than the twenty-five salesmen in Neiman-Marcus and the parking lot 
owners in Service Parking Corp. Id. at 791. 
290 Id. at 794–95. 
291 See supra Section I.D. 
292 Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 788–95. 
293 In Lindor v. Palisades Collection, LLC, a court even applied the test in the context 
of a negligence claim, during a duty analysis where a debt collector negligently damaged 
a plaintiff’s credit. 914 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
294 Research completed as of April 2018. See, e.g., Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. 
CBS News Inc., 65 N.E.3d 35 (N.Y. 2016); Anyanwu v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 887 
F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
295 28 N.Y.3d 82 (2016). 
296 Id. at 85 (“Cheetahs advertises exotic women and the . . . federal authorities say it is 
run by the mafia.”). 
297 Id. at 87 (citing Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
The Three Amigos court noted that defamation claims against businesses do not invoke 
the group defamation analysis. Id. This distinction is interesting and seemingly strained, 
since businesses would certainly otherwise qualify as exclusive groups and are often 
prominent within the community. 
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over 500 Nigerian businessmen could not give rise to individual 
claims.298 
A recent, and important implicit challenge to Brady comes 
from Dean v. Dearing, where the Virginia Supreme Court denied a 
cause of action for criticism of a small police force on 
constitutional grounds.299 The mayor accused the police of 
stealing, intimidating witnesses, and harassment, among other 
crimes.300 When one of the eight members of the force brought 
suit, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the claim as protected 
criticism of the government.301 Despite these challenges, the 
Intensity of Suspicion test provides a flexible analysis free from 
the injustice of arbitrary numerical limits imposed by the majority 
position.302 
D. Analysis of the Existing Methods 
First, consider what makes the group defamation problem 
difficult in all cases. Defamation claims ask the court to determine 
facts of perception about false statements.303 Such perception is 
ultimately a subjective enterprise, as our understanding and 
appreciation of language varies widely. Just as two readers of the 
same poem may come away with different interpretations,304 so 
                                                                                                             
298 Anyanwu, 887 F. Supp. at 693. The plaintiffs brought suit following statements 
made during an airing of the television show 60 Minutes describing Nigerian 
businessmen as “fraudulent and deceitful” and Nigeria as the “center of fraud in the 
world.” Id. at 692. While invoking Brady and the Intensity of Suspicion test, the court 
also noted that the “parties have not identified any cases where individual members of 
groups larger than sixty have been permitted to go forward.” Id. at 693. 
299 561 S.E.2d 686 (Va. 2002). The action concerned statements made by the mayor 
accusing unnamed police of “intimidating witnesses, stealing property, harassment, 
misappropriation of money, and improperly disposing of drug and gun evidence.” Id.  
at 688. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 See Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792–93 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1981). 
303 See supra Sections II.A–C. 
304 Robert Frost’s “The Road Not Taken” is famously interpreted by some as 
celebrating independent thinking and not following the crowd, when it actually comments 
on people finding meaning in arbitrary decisions. Christina Sterbenz, Everyone Totally 
Misinterprets Robert Frost’s Most Famous Poem, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:43 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/frosts-road-not-taken-poem-interpretation-2014-3 
[https://perma.cc/CZ8H-SCBU]. “Various quotes from Frost’s correspondence suggest [] 
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may audiences of a defamatory statement. The problem is 
compounded by the potential falsity of the statements, for which 
humans have both innate and learned defenses305 that operate with 
varying degrees of success.306 Such ambiguity creates a tension 
with legal principles of consistency and justice, which are more 
readily served by easily categorized facts that fall neatly into 
rules.307 Finally, the group dynamic changes the nature of the 
damages suffered by the defamed parties, because groups offer 
unique protection from emotional harm associated with 
defamation.308 
The Restatement position appears simultaneously more 
restrictive and more permissive than the Intensity of Suspicion 
analysis. Courts have interpreted Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§564A’s “if . . .  the group is so small” to mean generally fewer 
than twenty-five.309 This restrictive aspect of the analysis 
effectuates a quasi-per-se rule, which prohibits most plaintiffs who 
are members of larger groups from recovering individually.310 In 
                                                                                                             
he knew [that] people would misunderstand the meaning,” and even found their 
confusion amusing. Id. 
305 One example, widely taught in primary education, is critical literacy, which 
encourages students to actively analyze texts and other media in a search for the author’s 
biases, distortions and hidden meanings. See, e.g., Allan Luke, Critical Literacy: 
Foundational Notes, 51(1) THEORY INTO PRACTICE 4, 4–11 (2012). 
306 A meta-analysis of police detection of lies found that accuracy varied from eighty-
eight to forty-five percent across more than thirty published experiments using the same 
methodology. Maureen O’Sullivan, Mark G. Frank, Carolyn M. Hurley & Jaspreet 
Tiwana, Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario, 33 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 530, 531 (2009). These results suggest that the process of truth finding in the face 
of deception is complex and inconsistent. Id. 
307 See Jay W. Stein, The Hobgoblin Doctrine: Identifying “Foolish” Consistency in the 
Law, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1017–21 (1998) (commenting on the virtue and pitfalls of 
achieving consistency in the law). 
308 The extent to which such protection exists is uncertain, but evidence from studies 
suggests persons are better able to cope with stressful events when doing so in a group. 
See generally R. J. Corsini & B. Rosenberg, Mechanisms of Group Psychotherapy: 
Processes and Dynamics, 51(3) J. OF ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCH. 406, 406–11. (1955). 
309 See supra Section II.A–B for a discussion of the history and application of the 
Restatement position, adopted by a majority of courts. 
310 To clarify, a per-se rule would prohibit all individual members of groups larger than 
twenty-five, as proposed by King, supra note 196. A quasi-per-se rule as seen embodied 
in courts’ application of the Restatement analysis usually prohibits claims for groups 
greater than twenty-five, but this bar remains only a “strong presumption.” See supra 
notes 242–45 and accompanying text. 
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another respect, the Restatement test is more permissive, in that it 
provides almost no guidance as to how a court should determine 
whether the statement made personal reference to group 
members.311 This lack of guidance, save for a few examples in the 
comments to the Restatement,312 allows courts wide latitude in 
determining how to apply the test.313 
The advantages and disadvantages of the Restatement become 
apparent when applying and considering the test. The twenty-five-
person presumptive limit appears arbitrary, not only because the 
Restatement provides no rational justification for it,314 but also 
because the context of each defamation can vary so widely.315 A 
numerical rule of thumb may provide a useful guideline in a 
complex area of law, but also implies that courts could dismiss 
claims without considering important aspects of the defamation.316 
Additionally, the Restatement’s lack of guidance for analyzing the 
                                                                                                             
311 Comment A of The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) proposes the statement 
“‘[a]ll lawyers are shysters’ cannot ordinarily be taken to have personal reference to any 
[group member].” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1977). Comment B provides an example where the same statement, uttered at a social 
gathering with only one lawyer present is defamatory to an individual lawyer. Id. § 564A 
cmt. b. 
312 Id. 
313 See ELDER, supra note 229 (describing cases where courts applying the Restatement 
have disallowed claims for groups that meet the twenty-five-person limit, for example, 
because the group was too poorly defined, a justification absent from the Restatement and 
its comments). 
314 Rules of thumb, that is, rules derived from practice rather than reason, have long 
been subject to criticism. Static, precise rules face increasing scrutiny as “[t]he pace of an 
industrial civilization, its ongoing regroupings of interest, people, and problem, have 
presented new states of fact too rapidly for knowledge to keep up with them.” KARL 
LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 79 (1968). 
315 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a, b. Characteristics of the 
group, the plaintiff, the defendant, and the defamation itself all impact whether the 
defamation of the group reaches the individual. See supra Section II.C; see also Bromme, 
supra note 209, at 592–96 (1985) (arguing that many factors influence the holdings in 
group defamation). 
316 Consider Fawcett, Brady, and Elias where larger groups would not permit such 
claims to proceed under the Restatement analysis, yet courts have found otherwise under 
the Intensity of Suspicion test. 
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context of the defamation lays the groundwork for inconsistent 
applications of the rule.317 
The Intensity of Suspicion test appears to present a more 
practical alternative at first glance. Free from unjustified emphasis 
on numerical guidelines,318 the test begins to probe the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the defamation in an organized 
manner.319 As a practical matter, the availability of the test has not 
resulted in a deluge of cases where plaintiffs from large groups 
have been permitted to proceed. In fact, only three “large group”320 
cases have been documented since the test was first described over 
eighty years ago.321 Each of the cases involved a media defendant 
with “substantiated” accusations of criminal or unlawful activity 
by all or most members of the group.322 The Intensity of Suspicion 
test’s adaptability and evidentiary basis provide an appealing 
starting point for solving group defamation problems. 
The Intensity of Suspicion test’s advantages do not absolve it 
of its faults. Constitutional problems loom large.323 The test does 
not provide a consistent and rationally satisfactory method for 
making the determination.324 In Fawcett, the analysis weighed all 
                                                                                                             
317 The Restatement does not address social circumstances of the defamation, such as 
whether the defamatory material played into existing reader bias. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A; see also infra Section III.B. 
318 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
319 The Intensity of Suspicion test explicitly considers group definiteness, prominence 
within the community, and individual prominence within the group. See, e.g., Fawcett 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1977); see also Section II.C. 
320 Cases concerning more than twenty-five group members. 
321 See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017); Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 
N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Fawcett, 377 P.2d 42. 
322 In Elias II, the Rolling Stone article and related podcast alleged that some members 
of a fraternity committed rape, and suggested that all of them were either complicit or had 
participated. Elias II, 872 F.3d at 112. The publication in Brady concerned police officers 
who were not indicted as part of a corruption investigation, labelling them accessories to 
the crimes of their colleagues. 445 N.Y.S.2d at 787. In Fawcett, the article detailed use of 
illegal narcotics by members of a football team. 377 P.2d 42. In all cases, the defamatory 
material was published as a newspaper or magazine exposé, allegedly as the product of 
investigative journalism. 
323 The Intensity of Suspicion test developed prior to New York Times and subsequent 
decisions. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see supra notes 299–301 
and accompanying text. 
324 Of the three documented “large group” defamation cases, only the Brady decision 
was unanimous. Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 797. In Elias II, the dissent called Brady a “thin 
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of the factors except for group size in favor of the plaintiff, but the 
ruling left unanswered just how the factors are evaluated relative to 
one another, only concluding that the average reader would know 
the plaintiff.325 Restrictive aspects of the test prevent courts from 
examining the totality of the situation—only the enumerated 
parameters are certain to be considered, leaving judges with 
somewhat narrowed discretion.326 The test’s reliance on the all or 
some distinction for groups of larger sizes327 creates an additional 
complication, as illustrated by Elias.328 The question becomes 
difficult when a statement only implies that all of the group 
members were complicit, without specifically accusing every 
member.329 
The interdependence of each Intensity of Suspicion element 
jeopardizes the objectivity and efficacy of the test. Size is a 
frequently debated aspect of the Intensity of Suspicion test,330 
likely because the acceptable size of the group depends on other 
variables. Generally, the size of the group cannot grow to a point 
where the connection between defamation and plaintiff strains 
credulity, but courts employing the Intensity of Suspicion test have 
only precedent for a guideline.331 The prominence of the individual 
                                                                                                             
reed” and argued that the article could not be read as concerning all of the fraternity 
brothers. Elias II, 872 F.3d at 113. The dissent concluded, “It is not at all clear that 
[plaintiff’s group defamation] claim can survive even under our lenient plausibility 
standard.” Id. at 112. See King, supra note 196 and Bromme supra note 209 for  
proposed alternatives. 
325 See Fawcett, 377 P.2d at 51–52. 
326 While some courts, including Fawcett, have considered aspects of the circumstances 
separate from the original three enumerated by note, such as the plaintiff’s prominence 
within the community, it is unclear whether these rulings demand such evaluations in 
future cases. Id. 
327 See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
328 See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 112 (citing Algarin v. Town of Walkill, 421 F.3d 137, 140 
(2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing and rejecting a claim relying on Brady, because the 
defamatory statement did not indicate all of the group members)); see infra Section II.E. 
for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
329 See infra Section II.E. 
330 Compare Bromme, supra note 209 (suggesting size alone should not be 
determinative), and Marcus, supra note 276, at 1551 (rejecting size constraints of the 
group defamation rule), with King, supra note 196 (embracing numerical limits fully). 
331 Precedential limits may be just as arbitrary as those set forth in the Restatement. For 
example, the difference between a group of fifty persons as seen in Brady and eighty 
persons as seen in the original Elias I complaint is not readily apparent. See Elias I, 192 
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within the group, the group within the community, and the 
notoriety of the individual’s membership all play a role.332 Group 
exclusivity and organization also contribute.333 Whether the 
statement concerned all, most, or only some of the group members 
further relates to whether the consumer of the material would view 
the plaintiff in a dim light.334 Defamatory harm can occur in cases 
where statements lack complete inclusivity of all members—
allegations of certain egregious acts or knowledge thereof335 may 
prejudice the reader against an individual group member, despite 
ambiguous language. As group size grows, the fraction of the 
group defamed must remain high or total to support a theory of 
individual harm from defamation of the group.336 The 
interdependence of each of these aspects invites an evaluation of 
whether the inferences drawn by the reader are sufficiently strong 
to satisfy the “of and concerning” element.337 
The Restatement and Intensity of Suspicion approaches share 
many common features. Numerical guideline aside, both evaluate 
whether the size of the group dilutes the defamatory effect beyond 
actionable, individual injury. If a group is so large that “there is no 
likelihood that a reader would understand the article to refer to any 
particular member of the group,” it is not libelous of individuals.338 
In addition, both examine what fraction of the group the 
                                                                                                             
F. Supp. 3d at 394; Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1981). 
332 See supra notes 230–90 and accompanying text. 
333 Exclusive groups support the inference that the defamation concerned a definite set 
of individuals. Groups with a tightly knit social structure favor the plaintiff, as this 
feature facilitates imputation of the defamatory accusation onto the individual. 
334 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108 (citing Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 139–40 
(2d Cir. 2005); Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 794–95). 
335 Publishers are generally liable for defamation by imputation but proving such to the 
“actual malice” standard becomes a difficult proposition. See SACK, supra note 30,  
§ 2:4.5. 
336 The Intensify of Suspicion balancing process suggests such a tradeoff. See supra 
Section II.C. The incorporation of an arbitrary limit, such as the twenty-five-person 
Restatement guideline, could be reasonable where any larger group would require the 
implication of all group members. See supra Section II.B. 
337 See, e.g., Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (balancing a group’s size against its 
prominence within the community and whether it was a definite group before the 
defamatory statement). 
338 Kennedy v. Children’s Serv. Soc’y of Wis., 17 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Golden N. Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publ’g Co., 218 F.2d 612, 618–20 (9th Cir. 1954). 
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defamation reaches: whether the defamation implicates all, most, 
or some of the group members also weighs for or against 
recovery.339 Restatement jurisdictions have relied on the “group 
definiteness” requirement of the Intensity of Suspicion test.340 Both 
permit recovery where individual plaintiffs can be identified 
through extrinsic information.341 Finally, while the Restatement 
position developed after the Supreme Court’s landmark defamation 
decisions,342 neither test completely addresses important questions 
of First Amendment law.343 Such commonality suggests that the 
approaches are not mutually exclusive and could effectively be 
merged into a universal standard. 
The majority Restatement position and the Intensity of 
Suspicion test have desirable characteristics in addition to 
substantial shortcomings. The Intensity of Suspicion test provides 
flexibility and an evidentiary approach, while delivering 
inconsistent and constitutionally troubling results. The Restatement 
delivers a degree of consistency at the expense of flexibility and a 
reliance on arbitrary numerical guidelines. Application of the 
group defamation analysis to real world fact patterns illustrates the 
need for clarity with regard to constitutional aspects of the 
doctrine, as well as a consistent analytical methodology. 
                                                                                                             
339 For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a statement concerning some 
members of a court was not defamatory. Owens v. Clark, 6 P.3d 755, 760. However, the 
same court later found that it was defamatory to implicate all of the members of much 
larger football team. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 49–50, cert. denied, 
376 U.S. 513 (1964). 
340 Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1015–16 (3d Cir. 1994), 
reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Nov. 15, 1994) (rejecting a claim because the group was 
poorly defined). Without explicitly mentioning “definiteness,” a Restatement’s example 
prohibits claims where a group’s name could apply to many interrelated families. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
341 See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 2017); Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 383; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(b). 
342 The Intensity of Suspicion test predates constitutional developments. See supra 
Section II.C. 
343 The authors of the Restatement (Second) would have been aware of developments 
through Gertz and indeed incorporated negligence—an element previously unlisted in the 
Restatement (First). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(C); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). Nevertheless, the Restatement (Second) does not 
address the defamation of groups differently, other than suggestions as to the definition of 
“sufficiently small,” despite the New York Times’ effect on the “of and concerning” 
element. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A; see also supra Section I.D. 
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E. Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC 
Three members of Phi Kappa Psi, George Elias IV (“Elias”), 
Ross Fowler (“Fowler”), and Stephen Hadford (“Hadford”) filed 
suit on July 29, 2015, claiming that statements in the Article as 
well as Erdely’s statements in the Slate podcast defamed them.344 
In 2016, the district court dismissed the suit in its entirety, for 
failure to state a claim.345 The decision to dismiss the case as a 
matter of law rested on two findings: first, that none of the 
plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to show that the statements were 
“of and concerning” them, and also that the Podcast remarks were 
non-actionable opinion.346 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.347 When a trial 
court determines that a statement fails to satisfy the requirements 
for a defamation action as a matter of law, appellate courts review 
the matter de novo.348 Reviews of Rule 12(b)(6) motions349 are 
performed by liberally interpreting the complaint, accepting the 
pleaded allegations as true, and drawing all inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor.350 For the plaintiffs to succeed, the Second Circuit 
would need to find that the plaintiffs meet pleading requirements351 
                                                                                                             
344 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104 (referencing Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dropped their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
345 Id. 
346 Id.; see also supra Section I.D for a discussion of the “of and concerning” element. 
347 Elias II, 872 F.3d 97. 
348 See SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:38 (citing Jordan v. Kollman, 612 S.E.2d 203, 207 
(Va. 2005)). 
349 For a detailed overview of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6), see 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2018). 
350 See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 105 (quoting Chase Grp. All. LLC v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of 
Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
351 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (citing 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
entitlement to relief.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at  
557 (2007)). 
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for the “of and concerning” element352 with or without the 
materials contained in the Podcast.353 
The Second Circuit applied New York law to the case on 
appeal.354 In New York, “[d]efamation is ‘the making of a false 
statement which tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, 
ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in 
the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their 
friendly intercourse in society.’”355 To successfully state a claim, a 
complaint must allege the unauthorized publication of a false 
statement to a third party that causes harm, unless the statement is 
actionable without a showing of injury.356 In addition, the plaintiff 
must prove that the material was “of and concerning” him or 
her.357 The “of and concerning” element, central to Elias, requires 
that the plaintiff allege that the defamatory statement was about 
him, specifically that a reasonable recipient of the expression 
would connect the defamation to the aggrieved party.358 
                                                                                                             
352 See supra Sections I.B, II.C, II.E. 
353 Because the Southern District of New York had found that the Podcast was “non-
actionable opinion,” it was not originally considered part of the defamation. Elias II, 872 
F.3d at 104 (referencing Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, No. 16-2465-CV, 2017 WL 4126956 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2017), and aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, and remanded, 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017)). The Second Circuit would 
revisit the issue and hold that the Podcast materials could and should be considered in 
determining whether all of the fraternity members were defamed, while agreeing that the 
Podcast itself was non-actionable speculation and hypothesis. Id. at 109–11. 
354 Id. “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, 
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
355 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104 (quoting Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co., 987 N.Y.S.2d 37, 
41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (internal quotations omitted)). 
356 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104; see also supra Section I.C. 
357 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104; see also supra Section I.D. 
358 The plaintiff must show “that ‘[t]he reading public acquainted with the parties and 
the subject would recognize the plaintiff as a person to whom the statement refers.’” 
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104–05 (quoting Carlucci v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 442 
N.E.2d 442, 443 (1982)). Whether the plaintiff satisfies this requirement can be resolved 
during the pleading stage as a matter of law. Id. at 105 (citing Church of Scientology Int’l 
v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. 
CBS News Inc., 15 N.Y.S.3d 36, 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015), aff’d, 65 N.E.3d 35 (2016) 
(citing Springer v. Viking Press, 458 N.E.2d 1256 (N.Y. 1983)); see also SACK, supra 
note 30, § 2:9.3. 
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The plaintiffs, George Elias IV (“Elias”), Ross Fowler 
(“Fowler”), and Stephen Hadford (“Hadford”), graduated from the 
University of Virginia in 2013.359 All were active fraternity 
members during 2012, the timeframe relevant to Jackie’s 
accusations.360 The plaintiffs can be distinguished as follows: Elias 
lived in the first bedroom at the top of the stairs in the PKP on-
campus house,361 Fowler was rush chair for the fraternity, and an 
avid swimmer at the university aquatic facility,362 and Hadford 
rode his bike on campus after having graduated.363 Each of the 
distinguishing characteristics purportedly tied the plaintiffs to the 
Article’s story in some way.364 
In Elias, the Second Circuit found that the complaint met the 
“of and concerning” pleading requirement for two of the plaintiffs 
individually: Elias and Fowler.365 The ruling describes the finding 
as a “close call,” but that it was plausible a reader familiar with the 
plaintiffs would identify each as the subject of the statements.366 
For Elias, the court concluded that the events depicted in the 
Article were sufficiently detailed and descriptive of his living 
circumstances to pass muster.367 The Article implicated Fowler 
individually because it described one rapist as a lifeguard, as well 
as suggesting that the rape was a part of initiation, which he would 
                                                                                                             
359 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 101. 
360 Id. 
361 The location of Elias’ room becomes relevant because the narrative in the Article 
describes taking a staircase up to a bedroom without mention of crossing a locked 
security door. Id. Only Elias’ room fits such an account. Id. 
362 Id. at 102. The “rush chair” oversees the new member recruitment and initiation 
process. Id. 
363 Hadford’s propensity to ride his bicycle on campus after graduating potentially 
linked him to the Article because Jackie reported that one of the rapists fit such a 
description. Id. at 107. The Second Circuit would affirm that this connection to the 
defamation was too speculative to state that the defamation was “of and concerning” 
Hadford individually. Id. 
364 See supra notes 361–63 and  accompanying text. 
365 Elias II, 872 F3d. at 105. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 106. “Considering that Elias was a member of Phi Kappa Psi; he graduated in 
2013 (the year that the alleged perpetrators graduated); he lived in the fraternity house in 
the only bedroom on the second floor that was both large enough to fit the description of 
the alleged location of the rape and easily accessible by non-residents; and he was in fact 
identified by others as one of the alleged attackers, Elias has sufficiently pled that the 
Article was ‘of and concerning’ him.” Id. 
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have overseen as rush chair.368 Following publication, both Elias 
and Fowler allegedly experienced scorn from peers, co-workers, 
and reporters.369 While the Article did describe one of the rapists as 
bicycling through campus after graduating, these facts were 
“merely consistent” with defendant liability370—to recover, the 
court would need to connect Hadford to the statement in another 
way. 
Group defamation doctrine arose to address the “of and 
concerning” element where defamation of a group caused 
individual injury, but could not be connected to the individual 
specifically, as in the case of Hadford.371 Applying the Intensity of 
Suspicion test, the Second Circuit considered group size, the 
fraction of the group implicated, and the prominence of both the 
group and its members in the community.372 Weighing these 
factors,373 the majority found that the Article contained statements 
“of and concerning” all of the fraternity members, including 
Hadford.374 The complaint alleged that the fraternity contained 
fifty-three members during the relevant time period,375 which met 
                                                                                                             
368 Id. at 106. Fowler’s involvement in the fraternity recruitment process would have 
placed him in a position to have intimate knowledge of a gang-rape initiation ritual, and 
the Article also described one of the rapists as a swimmer. 
369 Id. at 105, 107. For example, “Fowler . . . received harassing texts, emails, and 
comments from peers, co-workers, and reporters.” Id. at 107. 
370 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007))). Twombly and Iqbal established that pleadings 
need to demonstrate more than facts “merely consistent” with liability. See supra  
note 351. 
371 See supra Part II. 
372 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108 (quoting Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 
786, 794–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 139–40 
(2d Cir. 2005)). 
373 The Elias II court held that each element of the intensity of suspicion test was 
satisfied by the circumstances: the size of the fraternity was not prohibitively large, the 
defamation concerned all members, and the social circumstances permitted easy 
identification of group members within the community. Id. at 107–10. 
374 Id. at 110. 
375 Interestingly, the number reported in the complaint varies. Sack reports, and the 
initial decision mentions, over eighty fraternity members. See SACK, supra note 30, § 
2:9.4, at 2–162. This number was later amended to fifty-three. See Elias II, 872 F.3d  
at 108. 
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New York’s precedential standard.376 The Second Circuit 
overturned the district court’s determination that the statement did 
“not expressly or impliedly state that the fraternity required all 
initiates to participate in a rape, or impute any knowledge of such a 
requirement to plaintiffs,” thus failing to satisfy the “of and 
concerning” element.377 The majority relied on statements 
suggesting that the rape was part of an initiation ritual378 and 
testimony from other women who had been raped at the fraternity 
as facilitating the inference that the Article accused every group 
member.379 At a minimum, the Second Circuit’s holding proposed 
that the Article and Podcast described all of the fraternity members 
as aware of the sexual violence of their colleagues.380 
The dissent in Elias took issue with several aspects of the 
ruling.381 While finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that 
the Article was “of and concerning” Elias and Fowler, the dissent 
asserts that the majority applied group defamation doctrine and the 
Intensity of Suspicion test beyond precedential and rational 
limits.382 The dissenting judge emphasized that to rely on Brady,383 
the defamatory material would necessarily implicate all of the 
fraternity members – a fact that was unclear from the Article and 
Podcast.384 In addition, the dissent argued that the fraternity and 
member’s prominence in the community failed to satisfy the 
                                                                                                             
376 Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 788. In Brady, members of a fifty-three-person group filed 
suit. Id. 
377 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108. 
378 Specifically, the Second Circuit relied on quotes from the Article and the Podcast, 
such as a fraternity member asking “[d]on’t you want to be a brother?” during the rape, to 
mean that the rape was “some kind of initiation ritual.” Id. (quoting the Article and the 
Podcast). If gang rape were part of an initiation ritual, these statements would suggest 
that all members of the group either performed or were conspirators to gang rape. Id. 
379 Id. at 109. 
380 Id. at 109–10. 
381 Id. at 111. Judge Raymond Lohier dissented from the majority opinion of Forrest 
and Cabranes. Id. at 100–11. 
382 Id. at 112. 
383 Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1981) (discussing the intensity of suspicion test). Brady is important to New York 
defamation jurisprudence because it represents the court’s first adoption of the intensity 
of suspicion test. Id. 
384 Elias, 872 F.3d at 112. 
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relevant part of the Intensity of Suspicion analysis.385 The dissent 
proposed that the appropriate solution, in this context, should have 
been to certify the issue to state court,386 so that New York courts 
could properly decide an important policy matter.387 The dissent 
concluded that the majority and plaintiffs “rely on an interpretation 
that is untenable (and yes, implausible) when the statements are 
examined in the context of the article.”388 
Elias and fallout from the Article’s publication have important 
consequences, particularly for news and media organizations.389 In 
litigation related to the Article’s release, a district court returned a 
verdict awarding another plaintiff, Dean Eramo, $3,000,000 for her 
depiction in the Article, although she would later settle for an 
undisclosed amount while awaiting appeal.390 In the summer of 
2017 the UVA chapter of Phi Kappa Psi reached a settlement with 
Rolling Stone and the Article’s author totaling $1,650,000.391 
                                                                                                             
385 The Elias II dissent questioned whether fraternity brothers on a college campus 
were, by analogy, as recognizable as members of a police force in a small town, as seen 
in Brady. Id. The dissent proceeded to question whether a plaintiff’s prominence within 
the community and intimacy of the community would even be considered a part of the 
intensity of suspicion test by native New York courts. Id. 
386 Certification to state court is the procedure by which a federal court of appeals 
defers deciding a novel or difficult question of state law by certifying the question to the 
highest court of the state. Certification to State Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2017). 
387 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 113. 
388 Id. at 114. 
389 In his dissent, Judge Lohier advised publishers to “beware” until New York courts 
have the opportunity to “correct[]” the error. Id. at 112. 
390 Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862 (W.D. Va. 2016), 
reconsideration granted, No. 3:15-CV-00023, 2016 WL 5942328 (W.D. Va. Oct. 11, 
2016). Dean Eramo alleged that the article depicted her as a villain, ineffective and 
indifferent to the Jackie’s plight following the assault. Id. See also Doreen McCallister, 
‘Rolling Stone’ Settles Defamation Case with Former U. Va. Associate Dean, NPR (Apr. 
12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/12/523527227/rolling-
stone-settles-defamation-case-with-former-u-va-associate-dean [https://perma.cc/J86P-
UPZY]. 
391 T. Rees Shapiro, Fraternity Chapter at U-Va. To Settle Suit Against Rolling Stone 
for $1.65 Million, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/education/fraternity-chapter-at-u-va-to-settle-suit-against-rolling-stone-for-165-
million/2017/06/13/35012b46-503d-11e7-91eb-
9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.b1fcbcb00ae3 [https://perma.cc/968F-64VH]. 
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Rolling Stone settled with the fraternity member plaintiffs for an 
undisclosed amount in the final months of 2017.392 
Elias highlights an important area of law, not only because of 
financial considerations for publishers and the standards to which 
defamation cases are decided, but also for First Amendment issues 
generally.393 The Article’s coverage of sexual abuse and the culture 
surrounding it places it at the forefront of discussions important to 
public interest. In addition, a group’s unique position of power 
calls to attention whether unnamed, anonymous plaintiffs should 
be permitted to recover as private persons. Finally, the Second 
Circuit’s decision highlights challenges presented by the 
application of group defamation doctrine. Had Elias been decided 
in a majority Restatement jurisdiction, it is very unlikely that 
Hadford could recover.394 Issues and inconsistencies arising from 
group defamation support the notion that defamation law fails to 
achieve efficient results or establish reliable protections of speech 
and reputation. 
III. GROUP DEFAMATION, POWER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Defamation law seeks to strike a balance between the 
protection of reputation on one hand, and freedom of expression on 
the other.395 The group defamation doctrine stands to benefit from 
the development of an analysis devised with First Amendment 
values in mind. Further, existing methods for determining whether 
group members may recover contain arbitrary obstacles, fail to 
                                                                                                             
392 Eriq Gardner, Rolling Stone Settles Last Remaining Lawsuit Over UVA Rape Story, 
HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/rolling-stone-settles-last-remaining-lawsuit-uva-rape-story-1069880 
[https://perma.cc/BYT7-S5JE]. 
393 See Section I.B, supra note 33. 
394 Because the group exceeded the presumptive limit of twenty-five members, Hadford 
would be disqualified from Restatement (Second) § 564A’s exception (a), where the 
“group or class is so small that the matter can reasonably understood to refer to the 
member.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Similarly, 
Hadford did not meet the standard set by Restatement (Second) § 564A(b), where 
“circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is 
particular reference to the member.” Id. § 564A(b); see also supra Section II.B. 
395 See supra, Section I.B.; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,  
325 (1974). 
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account for important considerations, and are inconsistently 
applied across and occasionally within jurisdictions.396 Part III of 
this Note proposes a methodology (“the Test”) addressing these 
issues. Section III.A considers the constitutional underpinnings of 
modern group defamation doctrine and proposes that the power of 
the defamed should inform the standard, as described in part one of 
the Test. Section III.B introduces part two of the Test, a flexible 
standard based on existing methodologies. Section III.C returns to 
Elias and applies the proposed standards. Finally, Section III.D 
comments on the proposed Test. 
A. Test Part One: Constitutional Law, Power and the Standard 
for Individual Group Members 
Lessons from First Amendment jurisprudence should inform 
discussions of group defamation, because of the “of and 
concerning” element’s close ties to constitutional law,397 and 
because speech about groups presents unique issues.398 First 
Amendment protections developed by the Supreme Court address 
society’s need for free and open discussion in particularly sensitive 
areas: defamation law disfavors the use of civil suits to silence 
discussion of public officials, public figures, and matters of public 
concern.399 These areas of especially protected speech reflect the 
spirit of the First Amendment and American values.400 Such 
                                                                                                             
396 See supra, Section II.C–D. 
397 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291 (1964). In its discussion of the 
Alabama court’s error, the Supreme Court found it unacceptable that the court’s 
reasoning “would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of [a] government 
[group], however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and hence 
potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed.” Id. at 292. 
398 See supra Section III.A. 
399 See supra Section I.C. 
400 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), overruled in part 
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (“Those who won our independence 
believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, 
and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They 
valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to the secret of 
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with 
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of 
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public 
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protections permit vigorous discussion of powerful persons and 
entities, which, at least in theory, acts as a check on corrupt, 
ethically unsound, or illegal actions.401 
To inform an analysis for group defamation, consider the 
Supreme Court’s rulings protecting speech against the powerful. In 
New York Times, the Court found restrictions on speech concerning 
the government itself illegal,402 and severely limited the ability of 
government officials to sue for defamation.403 Rosenblatt affirmed 
these aspects of the holding, in particular that speech that merely 
imputes wrongdoing to anonymous government officials should be 
protected, and where speech is directed at specific office-holders, 
“actual malice” must be proven.404 
Extending protections beyond statements about the 
government, the Gertz court described two reasons why the law 
denies public figures and officials the same protection from 
defamation as private citizens.405 These include the ability of such 
                                                                                                             
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.”). 
401 Id. The constitutional protections for speech and press were fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about political and social changes desired by 
the people. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269. 
402 Justice Brennan’s opinion described the Sedition Act of 1798, which prohibited 
criticism of the government, as unconstitutional under the First Amendment: “For good 
reason, ‘no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that 
prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of 
jurisprudence.’” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 291–92 (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 
139 N.E. 86, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1923)). 
403 Id. at 279–80. In Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court broadly defined the scope of 
protected comment on public officials as including commentary that speaks to 
dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motive, which may also affect the official’s private 
character. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (“Manifestly a candidate must 
surrender to public scrutiny and discussion so much of his private character as affects his 
fitness for office, and the liberal rule requires no more.” (quoting Coleman v. 
MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 291 (Kan. 1908))). Quoting Madison, the New York Times 
opinion proposed that the Constitution created the American government such that “‘[t]he 
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.’ The structure of the 
government dispersed power in reflection of the people’s distrust of concentrated power, 
and of power itself at all levels.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569–70 (1876)). 
404 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 77, 82–84, 86 (1966). 
405 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
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parties to defend themselves from defamation406 and the 
assumption of risk.407 Such abilities stem from public persons’ 
access to power and resources.408 As such, the Supreme Court’s 
restrictions on defamation require careful examination of the 
person or entity defamed.409 
Groups possess characteristics similar to those of public 
officials or public figures, and often involve themselves in matters 
of public concern. Many groups possess resources similar or 
greater than those of individual public figures or public officials, 
making them capable of defending themselves from harmful, false 
statements.410 For example, Rolling Stone’s Article faced nearly 
immediate censure from investigations by media and the police, 
                                                                                                             
406 Id. (“The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using available 
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse 
impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly 
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic 
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.”). In 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., an opinion delivered prior to Gertz, Brennan disagreed 
with the “access to self-help” reasoning, stating that it was “unproved[] and highly 
improbable” that public persons possess a superior ability to respond to falsehoods—he 
would extend protection to all statement of public interest irrespective of the nature of the 
plaintiff. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46–47 (1971), abrogated by 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For criticism of the “access to media” 
argument, see Clawson v. Longview Publ’g Co., 589 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Wash. 1979). 
407 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“[Speakers] are entitled to act on the assumption that public 
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of 
injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with 
respect to a private individual.”). Again, prior to Gertz, Brennan’s opinion in Rosenbloom 
made the argument that “assumption of risk” “bears little relationship either to the values 
protected by the First Amendment or to the nature of our society . . . .” Rosenbloom, 403 
U.S. at 47–48. 
408 The very definition of the two types of public figures in Gertz speaks to the power of 
the defamed party: universal public figures are those who “occupy positions of such 
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes,” and 
vortex or limited purpose public figures who “have thrust themselves to the forefront of 
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351. 
409 See supra Section I.C–D. 
410 Notice that the Rolling Stone Article prompted a robust defense from individuals in 
the group, as well as the national fraternity itself. See supra Introduction, Section II.E. 
Groups in other cases, such as the football players in Fawcett and the police department 
in Brady had considerable resources at their disposal. See generally Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42; Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1981). 
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likely with encouragement from offended group members.411 In the 
same way that public persons assume risk, joining a group could 
easily pass for assuming the risk that some of the group’s 
reputation may be imputed to the individual.412 While it might be 
unfair to burden all group members with risk created by the 
activities of other group members, individuals usually investigate 
and weigh such risk when joining a group, and are otherwise free 
to leave if they feel membership could jeopardize their standing in 
the community.413 
Groups possess powers beyond those of public persons that 
both reduce the risk of individual harm from false statements and 
make speech about them pertinent to protected public discourse.414 
Group defamation doctrine directly addresses the passive, 
anonymizing effect of increasing group size.415 Importantly, 
groups may actively or passively act to obscure bad behavior, as 
well as the identity of bad actors themselves.416 One example of 
active obfuscation from American politics includes the concept of 
engineering plausible deniability for group members. 417 In fact, 
                                                                                                             
411 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
412 Cf. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
413 Id. 
414 Defamation doctrine generally seeks to balance the interests of the individual with 
the interests of the public at large. Id. at 341–42 (“Some tension necessarily exists 
between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in 
redressing wrongful injury.”). 
415 See supra notes 232–37, 261 and accompanying text. 
416 Take for example the concept of “omerta,” known widely as the Mafia’s oath of 
silence and non-cooperation with authorities. See Henry Biggs & Pietro 
Festorazzi, Fuhgeddaboudit: Trying Times for Trying the Mafia Under RICO and 416-
bis, 42 N.C. J. INT’L L. 823, 825, 842 (2017). Another relevant example includes the 
cover-up of sexual abuse by clergy. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the 
So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-
Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2007) (“[W]hat does distinguish the religious 
institutions is a pattern of covering up child abuse, which includes (1) not going to 
authorities when abuse is reported to the institution; (2) imposing secrecy requirements 
on clergy and victims; (3) shifting perpetrators throughout the religious organization, 
both geographically and by specific house of worship; (4) asking law enforcement and 
newspapers to look the other way when they learn of individual cases; and, most 
important for this essay, (5) insisting on autonomy from the tort and criminal law for the 
organization’s role in the furtherance of the abuse.”). 
417 This term emerged in the 1970s, where political or paramilitary operatives would 
deliberately exclude certain persons from knowledge or connection to questionable 
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the very issue that Rolling Stone’s discredited Article attempted to 
address pertained to cultural and institutional indifference to the 
needs of campus rape victims—a phenomenon which ostensibly 
exists because of collective behavior motivated by a shared interest 
in suppressing unpleasant realities.418 
Groups often act in a capacity that would expose an individual 
to constitutionally elevated419 standards for defamation claims, 
even if none of the group members harmed by the defamation 
behaved in such a manner. In addition, groups are in a unique 
position of power in our society and are often involved in matters 
of public interest. This Note proposes that the group defamation 
analysis should consider whether the relevant group possessed and 
wielded power in such a capacity. If so, individuals bringing 
claims stemming from group defamation should be held to the 
appropriate, elevated standard without regard to individual 
characteristics. This follows from the notion that if individuals are 
permitted to recover from a defamation directly addressing only 
the plaintiff’s group,420 they should be held to the standard that the 
group would be, if it were acting as an individual. 
1. Elevated Requirements for Groups of Public Officials 
With the goal of protecting speech critical of power in line with 
constitutional principles, the first part of the Test would proceed as 
follows: Recovery for group defamation claims brought by 
members of governmental organizations would not be permitted.421 
This stems from the idea that criticism of groups of government 
officials is effectively criticism of the government, an offense for 
which there should be no criminal or civil penalty in American 
law.422 Where the identity of the public official plaintiff could be 
                                                                                                             
activity such as assassination plots, with the goal that the activity would ultimately be 
non-attributable. See S. REP. NO. 94–465, at 11 (1975). 
418 See supra notes 2–15, and infra notes 491–92 and accompanying text. 
419 See supra Section I.B. “Constitutionally elevated” means that the plaintiff must 
satisfy the “actual malice” standard as described in New York Times and the discussion in 
Section I.B. 
420 See supra Sections II.A–C. 
421 Declaratory and injunctive relief could remain available, as well as recovery of 
litigation costs. This would permit governmental organizations recourse for false 
statements without significantly impeding the free exchange of ideas. 
422 See supra notes 382–403. 
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deduced by a recipient of the publication, but some degree of 
uncertainty remains, the Test’s rule would favor the presumption 
that the defamatory material is inactionable speech about 
government.423 Where a public official plaintiff is named 
directly,424 the New York Times standard would apply as usual. In 
addition, putative and unproven damages without proof of “actual 
harm” would be prohibited. Public officials “must surrender to 
public scrutiny” any and all aspects of their character as relates to 
their fitness.425 In the rare case that the speech is immaterial to the 
plaintiff’s fitness for office, the Test would permit all types of 
recovery after the public official meets the “actual malice” 
standard. 
2. Elevated Requirements for Private Individuals in Powerful 
Groups 
The Test would then evaluate whether private individual 
members of a defamed group warrant the application of elevated 
protections.426 The Test would not apply in cases where the 
individual identity of private members may be readily deduced, 
inferred, or determined through publicly available information. 427 
Such cases render the Test unnecessary, since the legal fiction or 
inferential leap demanded by group defamation analysis is not 
needed to connect the statement to the plaintiff.428 Thus, the Test’s 
                                                                                                             
423 Such a policy is consistent with prohibitions on claims stemming from criticism of 
the government as espoused by New York Times and elsewhere. See supra notes 51–69, 
244–54, 402–03 and accompanying text; see also Dean v. Dearing, 561 S.E.2d 686, 688–
89 (Va. 2002). 
424 To be named directly, the plaintiff would need to show that the defamation 
unambiguously identifies him or her. 
425 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). 
426 Individuals with public figure status already face elevated requirements, obviating 
the need for the analysis. See supra Section I.B. 
427 In jurisdictions applying the Restatement, this would cover persons exempt from the 
prohibition on group defamation under Restatement (Second) § 564A(b). RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(b) (AM. L. INST. 1977). In jurisdictions applying the intensity 
of suspicion approach taken by the Elias court, such persons already fall outside the 
scope of the group defamation doctrine. See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2017). 
428 The “legal fiction” behind all group defamation claims is that the defamation of the 
group constitutes a defamation of the individual. Put differently, a statement “of and 
concerning” a group will also concern the plaintiff individually. See supra Section I.C. 
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analysis continues only where plaintiffs are unidentified, private 
figure individual members.429 
To impose elevated requirements on private individuals, the 
Test requires that the group qualify as a voluntary public group by 
satisfying three criteria. The first considers whether the group 
exhibits prominence within the community, as considered by the 
Intensity of Suspicion test.430 Further, whether to impose elevated 
standards for unnamed group members would rest on two 
additional considerations derived from Gertz and subsequent 
cases.431 The second evaluates whether the group possesses the 
resources to refute the statement,432 and the third asks whether 
membership was a voluntary endeavor.433 The satisfaction of all 
three criteria indicates that the group has achieved a status within 
the community akin to that of public persons, and that the member 
has assumed the risk of reputational harm inherent to membership 
in a powerful group. Voluntary, anonymous members of public 
groups proceeding on a group defamation theory would be 
required to satisfy the “actual malice” standard and would not be 
permitted to recover putative or unproven damages without a 
showing of “actual harm.” 
B. Test Part Two: Bias and the Perception of Truth as an 
Extension of Existing Methods 
While both the Restatement and Intensity of Suspicion test 
provide good starting points for the second part of the Test, they 
leave much to be desired.434 The manner in which a third party435 
                                                                                                             
429 Group members who qualify as public persons already face elevated fault 
requirements when the defamation relates to a matter of public concern. See supra notes 
65–90 and accompanying text. 
430 See supra Section II.C. 
431 See supra Section I.B. 
432 Group size, degree of organization, and access to media all speak to such an ability. 
433 This requirement is congruent to the “assumption of risk” reasoning described  
in Gertz. 
434 See Part II. The diversity of views presented elsewhere is illustrative. See, e.g., Stern 
supra note 203 (admiring the Restatement position, with a strong presumptive group size 
limit of twenty-five); Bromme, supra note 209 (suggesting five guiding social factors that 
exclude group size entirely); King, supra note 196 (recommending that courts view the 
group size an absolute bar at twenty-five persons). 
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evaluates defamatory material about a group involves a process 
more complex than current methods envision. In the context of 
group defamation, the “of and concerning” element depends upon 
more than whether the statement was about the plaintiff.436 The 
determination involves measuring the strengths and weaknesses of 
an inference, or series of inferences, that the reader must make 
connecting plaintiff to the derogatory imputation.437 The strength 
of these connections determines whether the material causes the 
reader to pass harmful judgement upon the plaintiff. 
The reader makes her inferences under the influence of an 
array of variables, making the analysis resistant to simplification. 
Such variables may include considerations as nebulous as social 
context, semantics, and how the individual perceived the statement 
in question. Thus, group defamation doctrine already requires438 
that the court enter into analysis akin to factfinder’s evaluation of 
third-party perceptions.439 For these reasons, it is not unreasonable 
                                                                                                             
435 Meaning the third party that receives the defamatory material. The material need 
only be understood to mean the plaintiff by one person outside of the defendant and 
plaintiff. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
436 If all statements “of” or “about” the plaintiff qualified for a claim, the group 
defamation rule would seldom prevent litigation. The statement must “concern” the 
plaintiff, “concern” being defined as “[r]elate to; [be] connect[ed] with; [be of] interest or 
importan[ce] to; affect.” Concern, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017). 
This, as well as the theories behind the group defamation rule, suggests that the statement 
must have some deeper connection with the plaintiff. See supra Part II. 
437 See supra, Part II. 
438 For example, the intensity of suspicion test asks judges to determine whether the 
defamation names all members of a group, explicitly or by implication, as well as to 
make judgments about subjective aspects of the group, such as definiteness and 
prominence within the community. See supra Section II.C. 
439 The third party means receiver of the defamatory communication. 
The distinction between ‘law’ and ‘fact’ has proved obscure 
wherever it is employed. For instance, the common law used to 
require that a plaintiff’s complaint in a civil action only state the 
‘facts’ of his case, not any ‘legal conclusions.’ Unfortunately, no one 
has ever been able to tell whether the allegation that ‘on November 9, 
the defendant negligently ran over the plaintiff with his car at the 
intersection of State Street and Chestnut Street’ is a statement of fact 
or a legal conclusion. In fact, the distinction between law and fact is 
just the legal version of the philosophical distinction between 
‘empirical’ and ‘analytical’ statements, a distinction on whose 
existence philosophers have been unable to agree to this day . . . . 
934         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:871 
 
to extend the scope of the group defamation Test beyond 
characteristics of the group and the fraction of group members 
implicated, as described below.440 
After determining the appropriate standards of fault in part one 
of the Test,441 the second phase considers how a statement about a 
group moves from perception to individual harm. The proposed 
Test relies on a balancing of the elements described in the Intensity 
of Suspicion test,442 with the addition of a fourth element 
considering biases. To satisfy the novel element of the Test, the 
defamation must be both believable and severe, overcoming 
resistance to prejudice against the individual. To score the new 
Test, most of the original elements described in the Intensity of 
Suspicion test must favor the plaintiff.443 If the analysis is 
equivocal,444 the Test’s novel fourth element decides the matter. 
1. Believability of the Defamatory Material 
When considering a defamatory expression about a group, the 
reader or listener first decides whether to believe the statement at 
all. The defamer presents purported facts about a group, which 
may or may not be true as to its members. If the material is 
unbelievable entirely, then the defamatory harm to reputation is 
significantly attenuated, even if the statement could be interpreted 
as about the person.445 Part of this determination normally occurs 
elsewhere: Defamation law prohibits claims for statements of 
                                                                                                             
LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF CRIMINAL LAW 276–93 
(Univ. of Chi. Press, 1987). 
440 See supra Section III.B. 
441 See supra Section III.A; see generally supra Section I.B. 
442 The flexible criteria of the Intensity of Suspicion test are sufficiently compatible 
with the Restatement, excluding the presumptive twenty-five-person limit. See supra 
Section II.D. 
443 See supra Section II.C. 
444 Because the original intensity of suspicion elements are not independent and require 
a degree of judicial discretion, such a result can be expected. See supra Section II.D. 
445 This concept is critical to group defamation theory. See supra Section II. 
Reputational harm entails a shift in a reader’s perception so as to lower the defamed 
person’s social or professional standing. Whether or not the statement is believable does 
not affect emotional distress caused by the defamation, an effect which the author of this 
Note believes is not a priority in cases of group defamation. See supra Section I.A. 
Individuals are well protected from emotional harm because of the nature of the group 
and the group itself. See supra Section II.D. 
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opinion, insults, etc., because these statements do not assert 
provable facts.446 The listener is expected to view such expression 
with a degree of incredulity, and such statements are rejected as a 
matter of law.447 
In group context, the Test benefits from incorporating an 
estimate of how likely the statement is to be believed by a 
reasonable third party.448 This is akin to determination of whether 
the statement is presented as a matter of fact or a matter of opinion, 
in that context and form are both relevant.449 The evaluation 
considers facts about the circumstances and the statement itself, to 
aid in the prediction of whether the defamatory material actually 
reaches or concerns the plaintiff. This component of the Test 
ensures that the reputational harm is real in the face of the 
protective insulation the plaintiff receives by virtue of being an 
unnamed group member, especially where the Test’s other 
elements may be equivocal. 
The perceived likelihood of belief can be expressed as a 
fraction or percentage of the likelihood a consumer would believe 
the statement. If it is more likely than not that a reasonable person 
would believe the statement, the Test’s believability element is 
satisfied. The determination considers several aspects of the 
situation including source trustworthiness, the plausibility of what 
has been asserted, and the propensity for confirmation bias. 
a) Source Trustworthiness 
Source trustworthiness weighs existing sentiment towards the 
conveyor of the statement. Source credibility theory450 provides 
                                                                                                             
446 “Common-law tradition has combined with constitutional principles to clothe the use 
of epithets, insults, name-calling, and hyperbole with virtually impenetrable legal armor, 
at least insofar as a resulting defamation suit is concerned.” See SACK, supra note 30, § 
2.4:7; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 52 (1988). 
447 See supra notes 122, 353. 
448 This would be the “believability element” of the Test. The reasonable third party is 
used interchangeably with the consumer, reader, or recipient of the defamatory 
expression. See SACK, supra note 30, § 2.43 (explaining the legal nuances of defamatory 
recipients). 
449 See supra note 446. 
450 See David K. Berlo James B. Lemert & Robert J. Mertz, Dimensions for Evaluating 
the Acceptability of Message Sources, 33 PUB. OPINION Q. 4, 563–76 (1969); Carl I. 
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insight into making the determination for media defendants.451 
Specifically, media credibility refers to the perceived believability 
of media content, beyond any proof of its contentions.452 Empirical 
studies have validated scales for rating the credibility of media 
outlets,453 demonstrating that the source of information reliably 
effects the degree to which outlets are trusted. For non-media 
defendants, a parallel process would consider the speaker’s 
perceived authority on the matter, as well as her prejudices, 
ambitions, and experience.454 For relatively unknown defendants, 
the Test would simply consider the content and context of the 
statement, described below.455 
b) Plausibility of the Statement 
The plausibility sub-component evaluates whether a consumer 
perceives the defamation as likely to be true, regardless of the 
source. Such a determination requires an examination of the 
statement as well as the circumstances of its creation. Statements 
made following an investigation, supported by witness accounts, or 
corroborated by facts and observations are more likely to be 
perceived as true.456 Statements containing obvious signs of bias, 
                                                                                                             
Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication 
Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 4, 635 (1951). 
451 Source credibility theory draws on themes of persuasion dating to Aristotle, who 
divined three persuasive audience appeals: logos, pathos, and ethos. Hovalnd & Weiss, 
supra note 450, at 635. Ethos, meaning character, is linked to credibility as it is presented 
to inspire trust in the audience. Kate Ronald, A Reexamination of Personal and Public 
Discourse in Classical Rhetoric, 9 RHETORIC REV. 36, 39 (1990). 
452 Mark D. West, Validating a Scale for the Measurement of Credibility: A Covariance 
Structure Modeling Approach, 71 JOURNALISM Q. 159 (1994). 
453 See Cecilie Graziano & Kristin McGrath, Measuring the Concept of Credibility, 63 
JOURNALISM Q. 451, 451–62 (1986) (describing a scale for rating media credibility); see 
also Philip Meyer, Defining and Measuring Credibility of Newspapers: Developing an 
Index, 65 JOURNALISM Q. 567, 567–74 (1988) (testing and validating the metrics 
developed by Graziano and McGrath). 
454 For example, a person’s status as an insider or subject matter expert tends to bolster 
their credibility in the consumer’s eyes. 
455 An “unknown” defendant, for purposes of the Test, is simply one without a 
reputation for trustworthiness or otherwise. 
456 This phenomenon is driven by evidence presented by the defamation to the 
consumer of the defamation. Evidence is defined as “the means from which an inference 
may logically be drawn as to the existence of a fact . . . the demonstration of a fact . . . .” 
Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017). 
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made thoughtlessly, or based on speculative reasoning evidence a 
lower likelihood of perceived truth.457 
c) Confirmation Bias458 
The Test’s analysis speaks to the reader’s ability and 
willingness to make the necessary, harmful inferences about the 
individual from what she perceives about a group. Importantly, 
these inferences must overcome the third party’s unwillingness to 
be prejudiced against the individual based on group 
characterizations.459 The group defamation problem hinges on a 
determination that a third party undertakes under uncertainty. Most 
or many consumers of a statement would give even a known group 
member some degree of the benefit of the doubt, or at a minimum 
hesitate to prejudice a member based on statements concerning 
anonymous fellow group members. Nevertheless, aspects of the 
defamation and circumstances could overcome such resistance, 
resulting in defamatory harm to the individual. If a high degree of 
suspicion already surrounds the group, the reader is more likely to 
accept the defamation as true.460 The Test considers aspects of the 
group, the defamation, and the social circumstances to make the 
determination.461 
                                                                                                             
457 This assertion stems from the fact that such statements suggest a lack of evidence. 
See supra note 456. Where statements drift closer to speculation, as the Elias court found 
with regard to Erdely’s statements in the Podcast, the likelihood of defamatory impact is 
reduced. See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir. 2017). 
458 See generally SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 
(1993). Confirmation bias is the tendency to interpret information in a way that confirms 
one’s preexisting beliefs or hypotheses. Id. As Benjamin Cardozo once explained, “We 
may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we can never see them 
with any eyes except our own.” Id. 
459 See infra Section III.B.3. 
460 See Kathleen Nalty, Strategies for Confronting Unconscious Bias, 45 Colo. Law. 45, 
45–46 (2016); see also Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors That 
Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 324–25 (2009) (discussing the results of a psychological study on 
the impact of confirmation bias during investigations). 
461 Questions of whether, and to what extent, the defendant’s statement harmed the 
plaintiff are questions for the jury, but the Test provides a flexible framework based on 
existing standards for resolving the “of and concerning” element. See SMOLLA, supra note 
40, § 9:56 (2d ed. 2017) (“[T]he question of whether a plaintiff’s damages were caused 
by the defamatory statement is for the jury to decide . . . .” (quoting Cockram v. Genesco, 
Inc., 680 F.3d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 2012))). 
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2. Severity of the Defamatory Material 
The gravity and individual reach of the defamatory allegations 
effect actual reader disdain of individuals within the group. The 
distinction made by existing slander “per se” categories presents 
evidence for such an effect: certain statements require lower 
evidentiary burdens at trial because they are presumed to be 
damaging or defamatory.462 When emotion provoking statements 
are made about a group, an individual who believes them would 
more likely entertain a hostile opinion of an individual associated 
with the group.463 The severity element of the Test is satisfied 
whenever the defamation satisfies any of four of the original 
slander “per se” categories. 
3. Overcoming Resistance to Bias and the Effect of Negative 
Statements on Believability 
The Test’s final step determines whether the believability and 
severity of the defamation overcome the inferential leaps a reader 
must make. This process accounts for the effect of emotion-
inducing statements on belief bias. Belief bias is the tendency to 
forgo independent reasoning and believe a false conclusion 
consistent with one’s beliefs, that is, conclusions that are 
believable.464 To ensure that the defamation is sufficiently 
damaging, the defamation must qualify as so under the four “per 
se” categories,465 which are often emotion provoking. Yet, 
cognitive studies show that a person’s susceptibility to belief bias 
decreases as the reader is presented with statements evoking strong 
emotion—people jump to conclusions less easily when presented 
                                                                                                             
462 See supra notes 155–63; see also SACK, supra note 30, § 2.8. 
463 Emotion strongly influences memory. Experiments demonstrate that taboo words 
and the colors they were associated with were more easily and robustly remembered. 
Donald G. Mackay et al., Relations Between Emotion, Memory, and Attention: Evidence 
from Taboo Stroop, Lexical Decision, and Immediate Memory Tasks, 32 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 474 (2004). See also Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 
308, 312 (1979) (discussing the inability of prejudiced persons to make rational decisions 
about individuals). 
464 See ROBERT J. STERNBERG & JACQUELINE P. LEIGHTON, THE NATURE OF REASONING 
300 (2004). 
465 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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with salacious facts.466 Thus, to satisfy the second part of the Test, 
the extent that the defamation is believable must rise to meet 
increasing reader skepticism when presented with negatively 
charged defamatory material.467 
C. Application to Rolling Stone 
To begin, determine whether to apply the Test’s analysis. The 
Article and Podcast identify Elias and Fowler indirectly, but 
individually to a sufficient extent468 placing them outside of the 
scope of group defamation.469 Unlike his fellow plaintiffs, the 
allegations in the Complaint regarding Hadford never successfully 
demonstrate that the Article’s readers could or did identify him 
directly.470 Given such, for Hadford to recover he must succeed on 
a group defamation theory, making application of the Test 
appropriate. 
                                                                                                             
466 See Vinod Goel & Oshin Vartanian, Negative Emotions Can Attenuate the Influence 
of Beliefs on Logical Reasoning, 25 COGNITION AND EMOTION 121 passim (2011). 
Whether such an effect is apparent in real life defamation remains to be seen. 
467 It is important to note that the defamation must provoke emotion in the consumer of 
the defamation, and not in the defamed party for this effect to occur. For example, most 
professional criticism about a third party does not invoke powerful emotion, resulting in a 
reduced resistance to prejudicial bias formation based on the defamation. Professional 
criticism of one personally, especially if untrue, provokes an emotional response, such an 
effect is unimportant to the analysis. 
468 All three plaintiffs contended that they faced a public that was easily able to identify 
them as the subjects of the Article. Complaint at 45–52, Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 15-5953). To satisfy the of and concerning element, the Complaint 
alleges that all three were members of the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity. Id. at 45–47. Elias 
and Fowler had “proudly listed” Phi Kappa Psi on their social media, while Hadford had 
not. Id. at 51–52. Elias was tied to the article by virtue of his room, Fowler by his 
participation as rush chair, and Hadford by riding a bicycle on campus after graduating 
and wearing fraternity branded clothing. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2017). While 
each plaintiff alleges to have been contacted by journalists doing research online, only 
Fowler and Elias were confronted or questioned in person, by persons whose statements 
suggested their potential involvement in the rapes. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 105, 107 (2d 
Cir. 2017). Hadford only alleges general inquiries via “message boards and forums, 
constant texts, emails, and questioning from peers, and soliciting from reporters.” Id. at 
107. 
469 See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 105, 107–10. 
470 Id. at 107. “The facts alleged with regard to Hadford are ‘merely consistent with . . . 
defendant’s liability,’ and are thus insufficient to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.” 
Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal citations omitted). 
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The first part of the Test examines whether the defamation of 
Hadford’s group necessitates elevated restrictions on recovery.471 
The group does not consist of public officials, and members were 
not involved in government.472 Whether PKP acted as a public 
group presents a more complex question.473 Hadford joined PKP 
voluntarily and the group possesses the resources to defend itself, 
satisfying two criteria of the Test’s first part.474 Finally the group 
appears sufficiently prominent within the University of Virginia 
community.475 Hadford and PKP satisfy the Test’s definition of a 
powerful group whose individual members would be subject to 
restricted recovery.476 
Applying the Intensity of Suspicion components of the Test to 
Hadford’s circumstances, the second part of the Test reaches an 
ambiguous result when considering the Intensity of Suspicion 
elements. The group and individual characteristic element is fairly 
straight forward.477 PKP is definite in number and composition. 
Because approximately thirty percent of students participate in 
Greek life at the University of Virginia, PKP is likely well-known 
on campus.478 Since Hadford lived in the fraternity house for more 
                                                                                                             
471 See supra Section III.A. 
472 See supra Section III.A.1. 
473 See supra Section III.A.2. 
474 Id. 
475 See infra note 478 and accompanying text. 
476 See supra Section III.A.2. In practice, the impact of an elevated standard in 
Hadford’s case is unclear aside from the prohibition of the recovery of unproven 
damages. In New York, Chapadeau dictates that even private plaintiffs must establish 
“by a preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible 
manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and 
dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties” whenever “the content of the 
article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably 
related to matters warranting public exposition.” Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 
Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1975). Sack has noted that this burden approaches that of 
the “actual malice” standard elaborated by the Supreme Court. See SACK, supra note 30, 
§ 6:4. 
477 The dissent in Elias II contends otherwise. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 112 (2d Cir. 2017); 
see supra Section II.E. 
478 In terms of group prominence, approximately thirty-five percent of students 
participate in Greek life at the University of Virginia. See Brochure for Fraternity and 
Sorority Life at UVA, UNIV. OF VA, 16, http://fsl.virginia.edu/frequently-asked-questions 
[https://perma.cc/XP7K-V7HP] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). Based on current enrollment 
statistics, approximately 4,800 undergraduate students participate in Greek life. See id. 
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than a year after graduating, during which time he rode his bike on 
campus and wore fraternity-branded clothing,479 his identification 
by some of the community also seems likely. 
The analysis becomes more challenging with the remaining 
two Intensity of Suspicion elements. The language of the Article 
and Podcast contains ambiguity for purposes of the “fraction 
implicated” aspect. The majority in Elias read the text to mean that 
the Article suggested all members were implicated, while the 
district court and dissent disagree.480 To read the Article as 
requiring rape for the initiation of all members, or that the Article 
sufficiently imputes knowledge of the crime to every participant 
requires significant inferences.481 Group size alone does not itself 
appear to be prohibitive given the other social aspects of the 
fraternity, such as the close connection between members. 
However, larger group size might lead a reasonable reader to 
question whether the Article truly meant that every member was a 
rapist or complicit in the activity.482 Within a group of fifty-three 
or even eighty persons,483 one could imagine how at least some 
individuals did not participate or have knowledge. Considering 
these factors, whether the Article permits a reader conclude that 
the article concerned an anonymous group member remains 
uncertain. 
Because of ambiguity in the result of the Intensity of Suspicion 
analysis, the Test’s second part considering bias and perception 
comes into play.484 The first step evaluates the likelihood that a 
reader considers the source as reliable. Rolling Stone magazine 
famously produces entertaining literary485 and sensational 
                                                                                                             
479 Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102, 107. 
480 Id. at 104, 112. 
481 For example, while the Article clearly implies that some PKP members may have 
been required to commit rape for initiation, it is not a foregone conclusion that all 
members were required to do so. See id. at 112 (Loheir, J., dissenting). 
482 Indeed, a reader could “also plausibly conclude that, even if all members of Phi 
Kappa Psi did not commit gang rape, they all knew that their fraternity brothers had.” Id. 
at 109. 
483 See id. at 102; see also Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
484 See supra Section III.B. 
485 See, e.g., FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS (Universal Pictures 1998). Hunter S. 
Thompson’s story was originally released in Rolling Stone and later achieved commercial 
success as a film, but likely said little about the objectivity of journalism at Rolling Stone. 
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investigative stories,486 in addition to its coverage of music and 
culture. As far as reputation for authoritativeness, the magazine 
seems to lie somewhere in between a “paper of the record” and a 
“supermarket tabloid.”487 It follows that a reasonable reader would 
rely on the Article for its truth because of Rolling Stone’s 
credibility as a source. 
The next step also supports a finding that a reader would rely 
on the information presented: the story unfolded as an investigative 
expose, backed by sources as well as corroborating facts.488 The 
Article contained well-articulated, plausible allegations with 
individual reach rather than generalizations, as the portrayal 
contained first-hand accounts of the rape.489 The defamatory 
statement itself appears plausible, specific, and grounded in fact to 
a reasonable reader. 
The third aspect of the believability component considers 
readers’ existing biases.490 Several large studies491 and high-profile 
                                                                                                             
Id. In fact, Thompson, and the protagonist in his story, prided themselves on embracing 
journalistic subjectivity. Id.; see also Brian J. Bowe, A Brain Full of Contraband: The 
Islamic Gonzo Writing of Michael Muhammad Knight, 4 LITERARY JOURNALISM STUD. 
91, 93–94 (2012) (providing a succinct definition of “gonzo journalism” employed by 
Thompson at Rolling Stone and the protagonist in Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas). 
486 See, e.g., Michael Hastings, The Runaway General: The Profile That Brought Down 
McChrystal, ROLLING STONE (June 22, 2010), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics
/news/the-runaway-general-20100622 [https://perma.cc/4HAF-24ZT]. Publication of this 
article ignited a scandal that ended in the firing of General McChrystal. 
487 Even following revelations about the Article, media review sites generally deem 
Rolling Stone an organization that presents a high degree of factual reporting, considering 
it “generally trustworthy for information.” Rolling Stone, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK.COM, 
https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/rolling-stone/ [https://perma.cc/WB5U-BV7T] (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2018). Northwestern Michigan College Library lists Rolling Stone on its 
“credible sources cheat sheet.” ENG 111: English Composition: Credible Sources Cheat 
Sheet, NORTHWESTERN MICH. C., https://nmc.libguides.com/ENG111/credible 
[https://perma.cc/M83D-J97K] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
488 See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102–03. 
489 Id. 
490 See supra Section III.B.1.c. 
491 CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL 
ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY (2007); BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN (2001). The results from the CSA Study 
popularized the often-cited statistic that that one in five women has been the victim of 
sexual assault at some time in college. P. KREBS ET AL., supra, at xii–xiii. 
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cases492 at the time of publication elevated awareness of sexual 
misconduct on college campuses. Prominence of the issue in the 
public discussion at the time of publication supports the likelihood 
that confirmation bias aggravated the defamatory effect.493 Overall, 
the believability aspect of the Test’s second part494 supports 
recovery for group members. 
After considering the believability of the defamation, the Test 
evaluates whether the defamation meets the severity 
requirement.495 That persons committed gang rape on a college 
campus meets even the laxest definition of a grave accusation.496 
Taken together, the egregious allegations and convincing nature of 
the Article suggest that a reasonable reader would have strong 
impetus to form a negative opinion of individual fraternity 
members. 
The final aspect of the Test’s analysis weighs whether the 
defamation and circumstances convincingly overcome resistance to 
prejudicial bias formation.497 The salacious and emotion provoking 
nature of the Article presents an obstacle, as readers hesitate to 
reach even believable conclusions under such circumstances.498 
Nevertheless, the inferential gaps discovered in the Test’s analysis 
appear surmountable by the Article’s convincing presentation of 
heinous behavior. As such, the defamation would likely result in a 
consumer with a well formed and powerfully negative opinion of 
all members of the organization, strong enough to result in harm to 
anonymous individuals. The second part of the Test concludes that 
Hadford may recover on a group defamation theory, while the first 
                                                                                                             
492 See, e.g., Andrea Pino, Why Filing an Office for Civil Rights Complaint Against 
UNC is Bigger Than Me, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2013, 12:39 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-pino/unc-sexual-assault-_b_2497326.html 
[https://perma.cc/M5HU-PVRM]. 
493 Importantly, just two years before publication of the Article, a woman published an 
article describing gang rape at PKP. See supra note 12. 
494 See supra Section III.B.1. 
495 See supra Section III.B.2. 
496 The Article’s accusation satisfies three of the four slander per-se categories because 
it concerns criminal activity and sexual impropriety, and it would injure with respect to 
trade, business, profession, or office. See supra notes 155–61, and accompanying text. 
497 See supra Section III.A.3. 
498 Id. 
944         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:871 
 
requires the demonstration of “actual malice,” and “actual harm” 
prior to recovery of any unproven damages. 
D. Observations and Criticism 
The Test creates a standard with many benefits.499 The 
prevention of public officials from recovering on a theory of group 
defamation denies the use of suits to silence speech concerning 
entities with officially sanctioned power.500 Elevated standards for 
unnamed, private individual members would grant publishers and 
individuals freedom to explore important issues concerning 
powerful groups with a larger margin of error.501 Finally, the Test 
facilitates the adoption of a more flexible, permissive framework 
for determining whether unnamed plaintiffs may recover following 
defamations of their group.502 
The Test provides a novel and flexible approach to group 
defamation problems, but also raises several important concerns. 
The Test applies a plaintiff friendly avenue to recovery under 
specific circumstances, where defamation doctrine traditionally 
restricts claims. Because of the emphasis on defamatory 
credibility, reputable publishers would theoretically face an 
increased burden to fact check stories. In addition, the bias 
checking element may slow discussion of matters important to 
public concern – for example, a report on corruption about an 
organization known or suspected to be corrupt by the public runs 
an elevated risk of liability if the allegations turn out to be untrue. 
Nevertheless, the test does not run counter to the spirit of free 
discussion and may actually enhance the quality of public 
discourse. For example, many of the Rolling Stone’s critics 
contend that the Article did terrible damage to the cause of 
underreported sexual assault on campus, because the scandal lends 
credence to skeptics dismissive of the need to for increased 
sensitivity. Constitutional protections, particularly when applied to 
                                                                                                             
499 These benefits come at the expense of a complex test, as well as the high probability 
that the test will at some point deny financial recovery to persons genuinely injured by 
false statements merely because they were members of a group involved in a controversy. 
500 See supra Section III.A.1. 
501 See supra Section III.A.2. 
502 See supra Section III.B. 
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the group as described above,503 shield journalism and writings 
about powerful groups,504 further narrowing the possibility of an 
adverse effect on public discourse. 
Because the Test potentially harms plaintiffs who associate 
with powerful groups, the Test also raises concerns for the freedom 
of association, another liberty promised by the First 
Amendment.505 However, the Test merely restricts recovery rather 
than imposing an outright bar. In addition, the Test’s connection to 
a citizen’s associations is remote: the threat of restricted recovery 
is unlikely to change a person’s decision to join or dissociate with 
a group.506 
  CONCLUSION  
Group defamation presents a complex problem requiring 
careful balancing of constitutional interests and a plaintiff’s right 
to recover for injury from false statements. This Note evaluates 
current methods for determining whether statements about groups 
satisfy the “of and concerning” element of the tort, found neither 
approach completely satisfactory while integrating aspects of each 
into a proposed Test. As part of the analysis, this Note proposes 
applying elevated constitutional standards to group defamation 
plaintiffs, if and when the group assumed characteristics of a 
powerful individual or entity. The novel Test allows a flexible 
analysis which protects sensitive public discourse, while permitting 
recovery where defamatory statements reach group members 
indirectly. 
 
                                                                                                             
503 See supra Section III.A. 
504 See supra Section III.B. 
505 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. 
506 Cf. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 2–4, 8 (1971) (prohibiting state 
inquiries into an individual’s views or associations for the sole purpose of withholding a 
right or benefit). Note that the Test does not cause the state to inquire about a citizen’s 
associations; under the group defamation rule, a plaintiff seeks a benefit or right by virtue 
of being a group member, a fact he or she volunteers to the state. Nor is the Test’s sole 
purpose to withhold a right—the goal is to balance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants. 
 
